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SUMMARY 
1. The objective of this study is to investigate 
various types of leases for leasing efficiency under 
specific farm resource situations. An efficient lease 
can be recognized as one under which the same farm 
plan is optimum for both the landlord and tenant and 
for the farm as a whole. The efficiency of various 
leases is investigated by using the linear programming 
technique to determine optimum farm plans for the 
landlord and tenant under different leasing and re-
source situations. 
2. The two farms selected for study are 160-acre 
units which are judged to represent "typical" farm 
situations in the Clarion-Webster and Tama-Musca-
tine soil areas, repectively. The farm representing the 
Clarion-Webster soil area has 153 tillable acres, 1,176 
square feet of cattle housing space and 364 square 
feet of hog farrowing space; the farm in the Tama-
Muscatine soil area contains 154 tillable acres, 1,600 
square feet of cattle housing space and 416 square 
feet of hog farrowing space. Both farms have ade-
quate grain storage facilities and machinery. The labor 
supply 'on either farm is composed of both operator 
and family labor and is available by months as fol-
lows: 275 man-hours per month from November 
through February, 335 man-hours in March, 350 man-
hours per month from April through August and 300 
man-hours per month in September and October. 
3. The following enterprises are considered in 
each soil area: three crop rotations with four alterna-
tive levels of fertilization each, one cattle feeding 
enterprise and one hog enterprise. The rotations in-
cluded in the planning for each area are a corn-corn-
soybeans (CCSb) rotation, a corn-soybeans-corn-oats-
meadow (CSbCOM) rotation and a corn-corn-oats-
meadow (CCOM) rotation. A two-litter hog system 
is considered in both areas. Pasture-fed steer calves 
are included in planning for the Clarion-Webster soil 
area, while a deferred-fed calf enterprise is considered 
in the Tama-Muscatine soil area. Long-run price 
relationships (adjusted to 1954 price levels) are used 
throughout. 
4. Four alternative capital levels are considered 
for the landlord ($500, $1,200, $2,000 and unlimiting 
capital); two alternative capital levels are considered 
for the tenant ($3,000 and $10,000). 
5. Under a typical crop-share lease in either soil 
area, the CCSb rotation yields the greatest return per 
dollar invested for both the landlord and the tenant 
when both are very limited on capital. The tenant 
with very limited capital finds it most profitable to use 
fertilizer, while leaving some acreage in "disposal" 
land; the landlord with very limited capital finds it 
most profitable to plant the entire farm to a rotation 
before applying fertilizer. Yet the landlord and tenant 
can reach agreement if both parties are limited to 
certain exact quantities of capital. A serious conHict 
of interests occurs, however, when the landlord has 
limited capital and the tenant has a high level of 
capital. In this case, the plan which is most profitable 
for the tenant includes a heavy livestock plan with 
CCOM and CSbCOM rotations; the most profitable 
plan for the landlord still is the CCSb rotation. These 
results indicate that a "standard" crop-share lease does 
not cause consistency of plans under all capital situa-
tions; the optimum lease varies with the resources of 
each party. 
6. Increasing the cash rental on hay under a crop-
share lease from $10 per acre to $16 and $25 per acre 
does not result in the optimum plans of the landlord 
and tenant becoming more consistent. The tenant still 
maximizes profits by paying the higher rent in order 
to obtain the meadow necessary for engaging in a 
:ivestock program; even with $25 per acre cash rent 
on hay, the landlord receives a larger return from 
CCSb than from the CSbCOM or CCOM rotations. 
In the Clarion-Webster soil area, cash rents on hay 
ranging from $39.85 to $48.64 per acre are needed to 
bring the landlord's return per acre from the meadow 
rotations up to the level of the return from the 
CCSb rotation. The tenant with $10,000 capital still 
maximizes profits by paying this cash rent and engag-
ing in cattle and hog enterprises. In the Tama-
Muscatine soil area, cash rents on hay ranging from 
$72.60 to $89.85 per acre are needed to bring the 
landlord equal returns from the CCSb and meadow 
rotations. The tenant with $10,000 capital maximizes 
profits by paying this rent on a few acres to engage in 
the hog enterprise but not the cattle enterprise. While 
these rental rates are out of line with customary rates 
in the areas, they do bring about consistency of 
optimum plans for the tenant and landlord. 
7. A crop-share lease which specifies that the 
tenant pays all fertilizer and seed costs widens the 
gap between the most profitable landlord and tenant 
plans. At high levels of capital for the landlord and 
tenant this lease modification causes greater diver-
gence of plans than a "typical" crop-share lease; the 
landlord finds the highest level of fertilization most 
profitable while the tenant finds only the second 
fertilizer level profitable. Thus, the plans of the parties 
differ with respect to fertilization levels as well as 
rotations. 
8. A lease which divides all crop expenses (in-
cluding operating expenses) on a 50:50 or 60:40 basis 
between the landlord and tenant also widens the gap 
between the most profitable plans for each party. The 
shift in expenses from the tenant to the landlord 
pushes the landlord's optimum plan toward lower fer-
tilization levels on CCSb. At the same time, this shift 
allows the tenant to engage in a heavy livestock pro-
gram requiring meadow rotations fertilized at high 
levels. 
9. The landlord and tenant reach virtual agree-
ment under a crop-share lease if the tenant does not 
raise livestock and each party has roughly the same 
relative capital limitations. Under these conditions 
both the landlord and the tenant find the CCSb 
rotation most profitable. However, while this leasing 
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arrangement brings about consistent plans for tenant 
and landlord, it is inconsistent with resource efficiency 
and maximum profit for the farm as a whole. Another 
plan can be found to increase farm returns and give 
more income to both tenant and landlord. 
10. The common livestock-share lease is quite 
effective in removing conflicts between optimum land-
lord and tenant plans-provided the two .. parties have 
the same relative capital limitations. If a choice is 
allowed between the livestock and crop lease, how-
ever, the tenant who has sufficient capital finds it 
most profitable to enter into a crop-share lease and 
operate his own livestock program. The landlord 
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with high levels of capital finds it most profitable to 
shift to a livestock-share lease in order to gain profit-
able uses for his capital. These differences are im-
portant in the sense that either party would sacrifice 
a sizeable profit by moving to the less profitable lease. 
11. A cash lease, although it involves more risk for 
the tenant, removes leasing conflicts if the landlord 
and tenant are able to find a mutually satisfactory 
rental rate for the farm. By treating the cash rent as 
a fixed cost, the tenant is free to organize the farm 
in a manner to maximize his profits. This farm organi-
zation has little effect upon the landlord since his in-
come is solely dependent upon the cash rent payment. 
Analysis of the Efficiencies of Alternative 
Farm Leasing Arrangements! 
(An Application of Linear Programming) 
By EARL O. HEADY, GERALD W. DEAN AND ALVIN C. EGBERT 
Approximately half of Iowa's farms are operated 
under some form of leasing arrangement. The terms 
of these leasing arrangements play a vital role in de-
termining how resources are allocated on these farms. 
Imperfections in leasing systems may reduce returns 
to landlords and tenants and restrict the total amount 
of product available to society. Under many leases in 
use, the farm plan which maximizes returns to the 
landlord's resources may not be the optimum farm 
plan from the tenant's standpoint, and vice versa. 
While the conditions of resource efficiency are not 
attained on many owner-operated farms, the leasing 
arrangement, ideally, should not contribute further 
to inefficiences in resource use. 
Within an owner-operated farm, then, an optimum 
allocation of the owner's resources is reached when 
these resources are organized in a manner to maxi-
mize his profits. The problem is more difficult on rent-
ed farms, however, because specialized resources are 
separately furnished by the landlord and tenant. Re-
source efficiency on rented farms is achieved only 
when the combined resources of the landlord and 
tenant are organized into a farm plan which maximizes 
profits to their combined resources. An efficient lease 
should permit and encourage the adoption of this 
single farm plan by the landlord and tenant. In other 
words, an efficient lease is one which allows the same 
farm plan to be most profitable for both the landlord 
and the tenant; this plan should also be the one 
which is optimum for the farm as a whole, without 
regard to resource ownership. In any case where the 
lease leads to a plan which is most profitable for one 
party but not for the other, imperfections exist in the 
lease. 
It is known that leasing arrangements do affect the 
efficiency with which resources are used on Iowa 
farms.2 Customary leasing practices do not allow 
maximum profits for the landlord when the tenant 
uses a plan which maximizes his own profits. Hence, 
many landlords impose restrictions on the cropping 
and livestock programs which can be followed by 
tenants. For example, the landlord may permit the 
tenant to produce corn and soybeans, but no meadow 
in the crop rotation. Or, the tenant may be allowed 
'Project 1135 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. 
'See: Heady, Earl O. and Kehrberg, Earl W. Relationship of crop-
share and cash leasing systems to farming efficiency. Iowa Agr. Exp. 
Sta. Res. Bul. 386. 1952; and Heady, Earl O. and Jensen, Harald R. The 
economics of crop rotations and land use. Iown Agr. Exp. Stn. Res. Bul. 
383. 1951. 
to grow no more than a certain acreage of forage (e.g., 
20 p~rcent of the cropland) in the rotation. On other 
farms the landlord sometimes specifies a minimum 
quantity of forage. 
OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate 
the problems of leasing efficiency under specific Iowa 
farm situations. Hence, the analysis of the study is 
directed toward answering the following questions: 
1. Do "typical" share leases3 used on Iowa farms 
lead to allocative efficiency? 
2. Which leasing arrangement most nearly allows 
an efficient use of resources under various resource 
situations for tenants and landlords? 
3. What adjustments in leasing terms are needed 
for the common leases to bring about leasing effi-
ciency? 
4. Does the optimum lease depend on the resources 
controlled by each party, or can a "standard" lease be 
developed which will lead to allocative efficiency over 
a wide range of resource situations for both the 
tenant and landlord? 
5. Does substitution of a cash lease or a livestock-
share lease for a crop-share lease automatically lead 
to an optimum allocative arrangement? 
PROCEDURE 
The method used in attempting to answer the above 
questions is as follows: Two farms have been selected 
as typical of rented farms in each of two different 
soil areas. The linear programming technique4 is then 
used to determine the farm plan (i.e., the crop selec-
tion, livestock program and farm practices) which 
will maximize returns to the tenant, given the capital 
and other resources available to him. Next, using the 
same empirical technique, an optimum plan is de-
termined for the landlord relative to his resources. 
If the most profitable plan for the tenant is also 
the most profitable one for the landlord and for the 
'''Typical'' share leases refer to the most prevalent types of share leases 
in the areas studied. For example, throughout the text a typical crop-
share lease will refer to the most common type of crop-share lease found 
in a specific area. Typical livestock-share and typical cash leases also 
refer, respectively, to the most prevalent forms of these two types ot 
I ... nses found in the areas studied. 
'For details of the theory of linear programming see: Dorfman, Rob-
... rt. Application of linear programming to the theory of the firm. Uni-
versity of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1951. 
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farm, the lease arrangement is considered to be 
optimum. However, if optimum plans worked out 
separately for the tenant and landlord differ, the lease 
does not allow the most efficient farming arrangement. 
These comparisons are made for situations where 
( 1) the leasing arrangement is given but the tenant 
and landlord have different quantities of resources and 
(2) the quantity of resources for tenant and landlord 
is constant but the leasing arrangement is varied. The 
procedure is nrst applied to certain existing or typical 
crop-share leasing arrangements. Then adjustments 
are made in the lease to see if arrangements can be 
found where the most prontable plans for each of the 
two parties can be made to coincide. Finally, livestock-
share and cash leases are compared as alternatives to 
crop-share leases. 
BASIS FOR ANALYSIS 
The analytical basis for the analysis can be illus-
trated by means of ngs. 1 and 2. Curve PP' in ng. 1 
represents the production possibilities for a farm with 
a given collection of tenant and landlord resources.o 
If the farm were considered on an owner-operated 
basis, the optimum plan would include production of 
OB:i of commodity Band OAa of commodity A: For 
this combination of products, the iso-revenue line" 
IIRb is tangent to the iso-resource curve PP', denot-
ing that the marginal rate of substitution between the 
two products is equal to their price ratio; IIRI repre-
sents the highest revenue possible with the total 
resources available to the farm. 
• Actually, the production possibilities considered in this study do not 
fonn a continuous curve such as PP' in fig. 1, but rather are a number ot 
distinct points. The production possibility curve may then be represented 
by anum ber of linear segments joining these successive points. The 
cCcomers" of this new production possibility curve thus become the 
relevant production opportunities for consideration in fann planning. 
For additional discussion of this point see: Heady, Earl O. Economics ot 
agricultural production and resource use. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York. 
1952. p. 255-258. 
Jo'ig. 1. Production possibilities from share rents which encourage 
efficiency. 
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However, the total product represented by possibil-
ity curve PP' must be divided on a rented farm. The 
plan which is optimum for the farm as a whole also 
will be optimum for tenant and landlqrd under the 
following condition: The division of costs and pro-
ducts must be such that the slopes of the production 
possibility curves for the tenant and landlord, along 
a straight line passing through the origin, are the 
same as the slope of the "total production" possibility 
curve PP'. In :fig. 1, for example, assume that the two 
crops are divided on ,the basis of two-thirds to the 
tenant and one-third to the landlord. Consequently, 
tenant and landlord, respectively, are faced with pro': 
duction possibility curves TT' and LL'. However, 
since the slopes of these two curves along line OM 
are the same as for PP', the "total production" plan 
which is best for the farm is also best for the tenant 
and the landlord. In other words, the tenant maxi-
mizes pronts when the plan for the farm as a whole 
combines crops to give shares of OB2 of product B 
and OA2 of product A to the tenant. Similarly, the 
landlord maximizes pronts with a farm plan which 
gives him shares of OBI and OAl. However, since the 
proportions OBt/OAl and OB2/OA2 are equal, and 
both in tum are equal to the proportion OBs/OAs 
for the farm as a whole, a single optimum plan exists 
for the tenant and landlord. The level of income for 
the farm as a whole, represented by iso-revenue line 
IIRI in ng. 1, is the maximum income which can be 
divided between tenant and landlord. 
An example of a lease arrangement which does not 
allow a consistent plan for tenant and landlord, with 
pront maximization. as the criterion, is presented in ng. 
2. Again, the production possibility curve for the 
farm as a whole is PP'. However, in this case, differ-
ential shares are given to the tenant and landlord. 
The tenant receives half of crop B and two-thirds of 
crop A. Hence, the tenant's production possibility 
curve, from the standpoint of the lease arrangement 
z 
o 
p 
AI A2 
PRODUCTION OF A 
F'ig. 2. Production possibilities from share rents which discourage 
cfficien,'Y. 
and maximization of his own profit, is DD'. With the 
remaining shares going to the landlord, the landlord's 
production possibility curve is DG (i.e., PP' is the 
summation of DD' and DC). In this case, the three 
production possibility curves do not have equal slopes 
along a straight line through the origin. Hence, the 
plan which maximizes profit for the tenant will not 
maximize profit for the landlord and vice versa. 
Given the same price ratio for the two products 
indicated previously, as noted by the slope of iso-
revenue curve IIRI (in fig. 2, 12R2 and laRa have the 
same slope as I1R1 ), the optimum plan for the tenant 
is OBI of product Band OAI ,of product A. For the 
farm as a whole, the optimum tenant plan would be 
that represented at point Z. This plan for the farm as 
a whole will produce less income (i.e., the iso-revenue 
curve passing through it is lower than IIR1 ) than 
the optimum plan QI' 
If the landlord can specify the optimum program 
on the basis of his production possibility curve, he will 
select OB2 of product B and none of A. For the farm 
as a whole, this is plan P at the upper extreme of 
the "total farm" production possibility curve. The iso-
revenue line consistent with this point is again lower 
than IIRl, the maximum profit level for the farm. 
Hence, under the leasing arrangements of fig. 2, the 
plans which are optimum for the farm as a whole 
, ( Ql ), for the tenant alone (Z) and for the landlord 
alone (P) are conflicting and discourage efficiency. 
Various leasing arrangements can cause the pro-
duction possibility curves for the tenant and landlord 
to have slopes deviating from each other and from that 
for the farm as a whole. A few examples of such leas-
ing arrangements are: (1) a low cash rent for forages, 
as compared with relatively higher share rents for 
grains; (2) a crop-share lease where the tenant has 
livestock but the landlord gets no share of the live-
stock return (e.g., a forage or grain crop which gives 
higher returns when processed through livestock may 
be profitable to the tenant, but less profitable than corn 
or soybeans sold for cash by the landlord); (3) differ-
ential share arrangements for costs and returns (e.g., 
payment of all the fertilizer cost but receipt of only 
half the crop return may cause livestock, and a rota-
tion to go along with it, to be more profitable for the 
tenant than a cash grain rotation; payment of all the 
drainage costs but receipt of only half of the crops 
may cause nonfarm investments to be more profitable 
for the landlord). Since the details of these and 
other conditions have been outlined elsewhere, they 
need not be repeated here.6 
That the optimum plans for tenant and landlord 
must be the same is only a necessary condition for 
leasing efficiency; it does not guarantee efficiency. In 
addition to this necessary condition must be added a 
sufficient condition: The optimum program for each 
leasing party must be the same as the optimum pro-
"Heady, Earl O. and Kehrberg, Earl W. Relationship of crop-share 
and cash leasing systems to farming efficiency. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. 
BuI. 386. 1952; Heady, Earl O. Marginal productivity of resources and 
imputation of shares for cash and share rented farms. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. 
Res. BuI. 433. 1955; Heady, Earl O. Economics of leasing systems. Jour. 
Fann Eoon. 29: 659-678, 1947; Heady, Earl O. Economics of agricul-
tural production and resource use. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York. 1952. 
Ch.15. 
gram for the farm as a whole. If the necessary condi-
tion is attained, but the sufficient condition is not, 
total income will not be maximized. A different lease 
and plan could always be found which would allow 
a greater total farm income, and, hence, a greater 
income for both the tenant and landlord. 
For example, the lease could allow only a continu-
ous corn or a continuous soybean cropping system 
and no livestock. The best plan for both parties 
might then be corn alone. However, leasing arrange-
ments allowing other rotations and livestock could 
increase total farm returns and the share to each 
party. Necessary and sufficient conditions will be at-
tained simultaneously, however, if the production 
possibility curves (all crops and livestock considered) 
for the tenant, landlord and farm have the same slope 
(see fig. 1). 
LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FARMS 
The present study deals with farms located in two 
major soil areas of Iowa; the Clarion-Webster soil 
area and the Tama-Muscatine soil area. Together 
these two areas represent a large portion of the most 
fertile soils in the state of Iowa. In each of these two 
major soil areas a 160-acre farm, judged to be repre-
sentative of farms of this size in the area, was chosen 
for study. The farm representing the Clarion-Webster 
soil area is located in Hardin County, while the farm 
representing the Tama-Muscatine soil area is located 
in Tama County, Iowa. Table 1 provides some of the 
background information for the two farms. 
Adequate grain storage fadlities and machinery are 
available on both farms. The labor supply on either 
farm is composed of (a) operator labor of 260 man-
hours per month from November through February 
and 275 man-hours per month from March through 
October, plus (b) family labor equivalent to 15 man-
hours per month from November through February, 
60 man-hours in March, 75 man-hours per month 
from April through August, and 25 man-hours per 
month in September and October. 
Farms were selected from two soil areas to de-
termine whether leases have the same general effect 
when different yield values are used. The similarity 
of results of the study for the variations in yields be-
tween locations widens the applicability of the study. 
TABLE 1. SELECTED RESOURCES OF THE TWO 160-ACRE 
FARMS STUDIED. 
Item Hardin County 
Predominant soil types .... _ ..... Clarion-Webster 
Farm .ize (acres) . .. ., .. ",.. 160 
Tillable aCres ." .... , _ . , , . , . , . , . 153 
Cattle hOllsing space (sq. ft.) ...... 1,176 
Hog farrowing space (sq. ft.) ,..... 364 
Labor (man-hours): 
Januruy ..... , ......... , .. ,.. 275 
Fcbruruy ... _ .. , . , . . . . . . . . . . 275 
March................. ..... 335 
April ., ............... ".,... 350 
May ... "................... 350 
June , ...... , ........... ,.,.. 350 
July , . , , . , ........ , .. , . . . . . 350 
Augmt _ ......... ,., ... ,..... 350 
Septemher .... , .. , ... ,.,.,.,. 300 
Octobcr .............. ,., ... ,. 300 
November ., ......... , ...... , 275 
Decemher .".,. _ .. , . , . . . . . . . . 275 
Machinery available ..... " ..... , .. adequate 
TamaCounty 
Tama-Muscatine 
160 
154 
1,600 
416 
275 
275 
335 
350 
350 
350 
350 
350 
300 
300 
275 
275 
adequate 
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However, it should be recognized that the two areas 
studied are rather similar in respect to soil and other 
characteristics. The results of this study may not be 
applicable to areas which differ greatly from the 
areas studied. 
the present study is to evaluate the effects of various 
leasing arrangements on optimal farm planning by 
the landlord and tenant, only a range of crop and 
livestock enterprises, proven previously to be pro-
fitable, are included in the present study. 
CROP ENTERPRISES Neither area studied has an extreme erosion haz-
ard. Also, the rotations and fertilization practices 
used do not allow complementarity of forage in the 
rotation.7 In areas where forage is complementary to 
grain, the landlord maximizes profits by growing the 
amount of forage consistent with this relationship. 
ENTERPRISES CONSIDERED 
Other linear programming studies8 have determined 
the optimum combinations and sizes of crop and 
'livestock enterprises for l60-acre farms in the two 
soil areas considered. Hence, since the purpose of 
7See : Heady, Earl O. and Jensen, Harald R. The economics of crop 
rotations and land usc. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bu!. :38S. 1951. 
"Heady, Earl 0., Loftsgard, Laurel D. and Paulsen, Arnold. Optimum 
farm plans for beginning farmers on Tama-Muscatine soils. Iowa Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Res. Bnl. 440; Mackie, Arthur B. and Heady, Earl O. Income 
opportunities for beginning farmers on crop-share rented farms in central 
Iowa. Production Economics No. 14. (Preliminary bulletin). Iowa State 
College. 1956. 
Previous studies indicate that only three crop rota-
tions ordinarily enter into the most profitable farm 
plans for the two soil areas. Thus, the rotations in-
cluded as possibilities for this study are a corn-corn-
soybeans rotation (CCSb), a corn-soybeans-corn-oats-
meadow rotation (CSbCOM) and a corn-corn-oats-
meadow rotation (CCOM). Four fertilization levels 
are considered for each rotation (table 2). Hereafter, 
fertilization levels for a given rotation are noted by a 
subscript following the abbreviated form of the rota-
tion (e.g., CCSbl, CCOM4 , CSbCOM3 ). Crop yields 
for the three rotations at each fertilization level are 
shown in table 3. The possibilities of these several 
rotations and fertilization levels are used to determine 
such .things as: (a) whether a landlord with limited 
capital prefers a grain rotation while a tenant with 
ample capital prefers a forage rotation for livestock; 
TABLE 2. POUNDS PER ACRE OF AVAILABLE NUTRIENTS SUPPLIED BY COMMERCIAL FERTILizER FOR DIFFERENT ROTATIONS 
AND FERTILIZATION LEVELS.o 
Soil area Rotation 
Clarion-Webster Corn .................. . 
Com .................. . 
Soybeans .............. . 
Com ...... , ........... . 
Soybeans .............. . 
Com .................. . 
Oats ................ .. 
Mcadow ............... . 
ConI .................. . 
Com .................. . 
Oats .................. . 
Meadow ......... . 
Tama-Muscatine Com ................. .. 
Corn .................. . 
Soybeans ............... . 
Corn ................. .. 
Soybeans .............. . 
Com .................. . 
Oats .................. . 
Meadow ............... . 
Com .................. . 
Com .................. . 
Oats .................. . 
Meadow ............... . 
N 
o 
o 
o 
First 
P K 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
000 
000 
o 0 0 
000 
o 0 0 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
o 0 0 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
Fertilization levels 
Second Third Fourth 
N P K N P K N P K 
15 20 10 45 50 20 75 60 20 
:30 20 10 50 25 20 70 30 2U 
o 0 U 0 o 0 o 20 0 
5 20 10 10 50 20 40 60 20 
o 0 U o 0 0 o 10 0 
15 20 10 45 50 20 75 60 20 
10 20 0 15 10 0 20 10 40 
o 0 0 000 o 0 0 
5 20 10 10 50 20 40 60 20 
SO 20 10 60 25 20 80 SO 20 
10 20 0 15 20 0 20 35 SO 
o 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 U 
10 15 20 30 20 10 50 40 20 
:30 15 10 60 20 10 100 20 20 
o 0 0 o . 0 0 o 40 0 
10 15 20 30 20 10 50 40 20 
o 0 0 o 0 0 o 20 0 
30 15 10 60 20 10 100 40 20 
10 20 0 20 40 0 o 20 0 
o 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 
10 15 10 :30 20 10 50 40 20 
30 15 10 60 20 10 100 20 20 
10 20 0 20 40 0 o 40 U 
o 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 
0The fertilization rates in this table Were furnished in February and May, 1955 by the Agronomy Departmmt, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. The 
yield estimates in table 3 are based upon these fertilization rates. 
TABLE 3. ESTIMATED CROP YIELDS FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF FERTILIZATION." 
Rotation 
Com ....................... . 
Corn ................... ···· . 
Soybeans ................... . 
Com ...................... .. 
Soybeans ................... . 
Corn ....................... . 
Oats ....................... . 
Mcadow .................... . 
Com ...................... .. 
Com ...................... .. 
Oats ....................... . 
Meadow .................... . 
First 
40 
32 
19 
58 
20 
50 
32 
1.9 
58 
48 
32 
1.9 
Clarion-''1ebster soil area 
Fertilization levelst 
Second Third 
50 57 
42 49 
21 2:3 
65 
22 
56 
:38 
2.2 
65 
54 
38 
2.2 
67 
24 
59 
41 
2.4 
67 
57 
41 
2.4 
Fourth 
59 
51 
24 
68 
25 
61 
43 
2.5 
68 
59 
43 
2.5 
First 
50 
45 
28 
60 
26 
55 
35 
2.1 
60 
52 
35 
2.1 
Tama-~Iuscatine soil area 
Fertilization levelst 
Second Third 
63 68 
60 67 
28 28 
69 
28 
65 
45 
2.5 
70 
67 
45 
2.5 
74 
28 
71 
48 
2.8 
75 
71 
48 
2.8 
Fourth 
72 
71 
:32 
77 
32 
75 
45 
3.0 
78 
72 
45 
3.0 
.Souret': Agronomy Department, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, February and May, 1955. Yields are in bushels per acre for grain crops and tons 
per acre for meadow. 
tSee table 2 for the quantities of fertilizer applied at each fertilization level. 
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(b) whether a landlord with ample capital prefers a 
heavy level of fertilization while a tenant with limited 
funds prefers a low level of fertilization with part 
of his capital invested in livestock; (c) whether the 
method of sharing fertilizer costs and crop returns 
affects the level of fertilization desired by each party. 
LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
For the purposes of this study only two livestock 
enterprises are considered in the planning for each 
farm and are explained below. These two enterprises 
include the most profitable hog system and cattle 
feeding programs for average conditions (determined 
from the studies cited previously). Dairy and poultry 
enterprises are not included since they were found to 
enter the optimum program infrequently and then 
with only minor changes in income. 
Livestock enterprises are included to determine 
whether situations exist where the tenant under a 
crop-share lease would prefer to invest in livestock 
and accompanying rotations, rather than a fertilization 
plan and cropping system which is optimum for the 
landlord. Livestock enterprises also are included to 
determine if a shift from a crop-share to a livestock-
share lease causes the same plan to be optimum for 
the tenant and landlord; or, whether relative differ-
ences in capital available to the two parties still cause 
divergencies in plans. 
Two-litter hog system. Under the two-litter hog 
system, the spring litter is farrowed in April and mar-
keted the following October and November; the fall 
litter is farrowed in October and marketed in March 
and April. Fall litters are fed entirely on drylot while 
spring litters use pasture. Gilts are kept from the fall 
litters to be used as sows the following year; hence, 
annual hog sales include the remainder of the fall lit-
ter, all of the spring litter and one sow. With an 
assumed average of 13.5 pigs weaned per sow (two 
litters) the annual production of pork per sow is 
3,051 pounds. The two-litter system is the only hog 
system considered in each soil area. 
Pasture-fed steer calves. In this beef e~terprise, 
430-pound good to choice steer calves are purchased 
in October and sold at 990 pounds the following 
September (a death loss of 2.5 percent is assumed). 
The calves are wintered in drylot on roughage and a 
limited amount of grain. From May to July the calves 
are placed on pasture while grain feeding is increased. 
Intensive grain feeding in drylot starts in July and 
continues until the finished cattle are sold in Septem-
~ ber. The pasture-fed steer calf enterprise is the only 
beef enterprise included in planning for the Clarion-
Webster soil area. 
Deferred-fed steer calves. With this beef enterprise, 
good to choice steer calves are purchased in October 
at an initial weight of 402 pounds. These calves are 
wintered on roughage and put on pasture without 
grain feeding from May to August. Intensive grain 
feeding begins when the cattle are taken off pastur~ 
in August and continues until the latter part of 
November when the cattle are marketed at an aver-
age weight of 1,056 pounds. Death loss is estimated to 
be 3 percent. The deferred-fed steer calf enterprise 
is the only beef enterprise included in farm planning 
for the Tama-Muscatine soil area. 
CAPITAL LEVELS AND COSTS 
The optimum farm plans for the landlord and tenant 
are expected to vary considerably with different levels 
of available capital. Four capital levels are assumed 
for the landlord; $500, $1,200, $2,000 and unlimiting 
capital. The $500 capital level was chosen because 
it represents approximately the quantity of capital 
required to pay the landlord's share of the expenses 
associated with planting the entire farm to a rotation. 
Capital levels above $2,000 are usually required only 
when the landlord enters into a livestock-share lease. 
Only two capital levels are considered for the tenant-
$3,000 and $10,000 available capital. With a $3,000 
capital level, the tenant can pay approximately his 
share of the expenses of putting the entire farm into 
rotation; at a $10,000 capital level the tenant has 
sufficient capital to engage in a sizeable livestock pro-
gram. 
The quantities of capital available to the landlord 
and tenant are used only to pay variable costs, i.e., 
those costs which vary with production. Table 4 
shows the variable costs (or capital requirements) 
associated with the various livestock enterprises. In-
cluded in the variable costs are the items of feed costs, 
cost of the livestock, breeding and veterinary fees, 
depreciation on livestock equipment and other miscel-
laneous expenses. While depreciation on livestock 
equipment is ordinarily treated as a fixed cost, it is 
included here as a variable cost because investment 
in livestock equipment does not occur unless livestock 
are included in the farm plan. 
Total variable costs or capital requirements (for 
shares of both tenant and landlord and not including 
fixed expenses) associated with various crop rota-
tions are listed in table 5. The cost figures in table 5 
are the total variable costs of growing 1 acre of 
a particular rotation, i.e., a sum of the variable costs 
TABLE 4. RESOURCE REQumEMENTS PER UNIT OF 
LIVESTOCK OUTPUT.· 
Two-litter Pasture-fed Deferred-fed 
Resources Unit hog-system steer-co.lves steer calves 
Capitalt: dollars 8.16 137.80 133.95 
Feed: 
3,007.2 Corn equival .. nU lbs. 458.4 2,800 
Hay equivalenU lbs. 47.8 1,766 2,267 
Protein supplement lb •. 45.1 229 268.1 
Bflild/ng space: sq. feet 2.40727 20 20 
Labor: man-bour. 
JanuarY 0.17220 1.082 0.225 
February 0.14950 1.063 0.225 
March 0.15664 1.063 0.225 
April 0.14360 1.492 0.225 
May 0.12836 2.417 O.l1Z 
June 0.12662 2.417 0.112 
July 0.12478 2.417 0.112 
August 0.15939 2.417 0.112 
September 0.20789 1.074 2.175 
October 0.20140 1.063 3.100 
November 0.18433 1.063 2.975 
December 0.17837 1.082 2.862 
• A unit of hog. i. 100 lbs. pork, all other livestock units on a per-
head basi.. For greater detail and sourceS of the inputs in this table, see 
tableA-1, Appendix A. 
tCapital required for total variable cost •. 
*Oats are conv,erted to com equivo.lent on the basis of 2 bu.hel. 
oats = 1 bu,hel corn. 
§Include. hay fed in drylot plus hay consumed on pasture. 
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TABLE 5. TOTAL VARIABLE COSTSo FOR CROPS, 1954 PRICES. 
Rotation and 
fertilizer ratet 
CCSbl ............... . 
CCSb. . ............. . 
CCSb3 ................ . 
CCSb •................. 
CSbCOMl ............ . 
CSbCOM •.............. 
CSbCOM3 .. : .......... . 
CSbCOM •.............. 
CCOMl ............... . 
CCOM •................ 
CCOM •................ 
CCOM •................ 
Total variable costs per acre of rotation 
Clarion-Webster Tama-Muscatine 
soil area soil area 
( dollars) ( dollars) 
20.52 21.02 
24.93 25.13 
29.27 28.23 
33.03 33.03 
22.12 
25.35 
29.29 
32.68 
22.20 
25.11 
27.64 
30.63 
22.46 
27.02 
30.54 
32.90 
22.52 
26.09 
29.05 
31.25 
°lncludes all variable costs nonnally divided between the tenant and 
landlord under a crop-share lease. For sources and breakdown of these 
costs, See tables A-2 and A-3, Appendix A. 
rSubscripts to the rotations refer to the fertilizer rates shown in table 2. 
normally paid separately by the landlord and tenant. 
Therefore, the crop rotation expenses include seed 
and fertilizer costs, fuel, oil and repairs on machinery 
used in crop production, hired machinery or hired 
labor for crop production, and repairs on buildings 
used for grain and hay storage.9 The machinery in-
vestment for crop production has been treated as a 
fixed cost since a given amount of machinery must be 
available for use by the tenant before the farm can 
be planted to any rotation. 
In general, 'items which are normally considered as 
fixed costs are treated as such in this study.lO Hence, 
they do not enter the capital requiremerits for farm 
planning. Fixed costs include depreciation and insur-
ance on farm machinery and buildings, property taxes 
and miscellaneous items such as telephone and elec-
tricity. However, these fixed costs have no effect on 
the plan which is optimum under a particular capital 
or lease situation. Since the capital requirements do 
not include fixed costs, the return computed for 
various farm plans is merely a return above annual 
expenses (i.e., annual variable costs, but not fixed 
costs or capital investment, are considered in comput-
ing the net prices used in linear programming). The 
true net return for each plan could thus be com-
puted by subtracting fixed costs from the income 
quantities shown. 
PRICES USED IN PLANNING 
The price relationships used throughout this study 
are summarized in table 6. The pricing methods used 
in this study attempted to maintain the average his-
torical price relationships among inputs and outputs, 
while adjusting all prices to the general price level 
prevailing in 1954: First, the average price of each 
item was determined for the period 1950-54, except 
that hog and feeder cattle prices were computed for 
the periods 1947-54 and 1935-5411, respectively. Sec-
ond, the product of the 1954 average corn price times. 
.Repairs on grain and hay storage buildings are treated 115 variable 
rather than fixed costs because these repairs would be unnecessary it 
tbe buildings were not used for storage. 
lOThe exceptions ?f ( 1 ) depreciation on. liyestock equipm""!t and 
(2) repairs On gram and hay storage bUlldmgs are noted 10 the 
previous paragraph. 
llThe longer period was co.nsidered. to allow greater cert:'inty that 
Ihe price ratios used wt're consIstent WIth the average of tbe mira-cycle 
range for the various commodities. 
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE ADJUSTED PRICES OF THE INPUTS AND 
OUfPUTS USED IN THIS STUDY.o 
Item Unit 
Seed and fertllizeT: 
Com .................... .. bu. 
Soybeans .. . . . . . . . . .. . ... . bu. 
Oats ..................... . bu. 
lb. 
lb. 
lb. 
Nitrogen (N) .............. . 
Phosphorus (P.O.) ......... . 
Potassium (K.O) ........... . 
Peed and grain: 
Purchase 
price 
11.50 
4.30 
1.00 
0.15 
0.11 
0.06 
Selling 
price 
bu. 1.43 Com .................... 1.43 
bu. 0.78 Oats. . .. .. . . . .. .. . . .. . . .. . . 0.78 
bu. 
17.40 
Soybeans .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.74 
ton 
cwl. 4.80 
cwt. 5.60 
Mixed hay ................. '. 
Cattle supplement .......... . 
Hog supplement ............ . 
cwl. 24.10 
Live~ock and livestock products: 
Deferred-fed steer calves ...... 26.61 
cwt. 24.10 Pasture-fed steer calves ....... 25.98 
Pigs sold in October and 
November . cwt. In.l.~ 
Pigs sold in March and April. . cwt. 1'9.47 20.15 
Sow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cwt. 18.75 
Composite hog pricet ......... cwl. 19.83 
OThe prices used were obtained by computing the 1950-54 average 
prices, then adjusting to the 1954 price level. 
tComposite hog price is the weighted composite price per cWl. of fall 
pigs, spring pigs and the sow. 
the average price of the item over a given period 
was divided by the average corn price over that same 
period; the resulting figure is the adjusted avera$e 
price of the item. The calculation is ipustrated below 
for hogs: 
Average adjusted 
price of hogs = 
Average corn 
price, 
1954 
Average hog 
X price, 
1947 to 1954 
Average corn price, 
1947 to 1954 
The linear programming technique requires that a 
net price be determined for each activity. A gross price 
for each activity is computed by multiplying the vari-
ous products produced per unit of this activity (which 
mayor may not include livestock products) by the 
individual product prices. From this gross price is sub-
tracted the annual expenses (variable costs) involved 
in producing one unit of this activity. The resulting 
figure is the net price per unit of an activity or the 
return per activity above annual expenses. Every unit 
of this activity which enters the optimum farm plan 
is assumed to have this same net price. 
TYPES OF LEASES 
The analysis in this study revolves around the use 
of various types of leasing and resource situations. 
Outlined below are the terms of the different leases 
considered in "the study. Optimum plans are com-
puted for each of the leasing situations with various 
combinations of capital levels for the tenant and the 
landlord'" (see table 7 following for the combina-
tions of capital situations under one lease). Of the 
crop-share leases considered, lease Ai is the most 
prevalent or typical crop-share arrangement existing 
in the two areas. Leases As and A4 are variations of 
"In other words, two sets of plans (one set for the tenant and one 
for the landlord) have' been worked out by the linear programming 
technique for each combination of cnpital situations under each lease 
arrangement. 
the typical crop-share lease (Ad; these leasing varia-
tions are also frequently used in the areas studied. 
Crop-share leases A2 , A5 and As are leasing arrange-
ments which have been suggested as possible alterna-
tives to existing crop-share leases. The typical or 
"most common" livestock-share lease is considered to 
determine whether a consistent optimum plan can be 
determined under this leasing arrangement when a 
crop-share lease does not lead to consistent plans. A 
cash lease provides the final type of lease to be tested 
for leasing efficiency. 
CROP-SHARE LEASES 
At. Typical crop-share lease 
Item 
Corn .................. .. 
Soybeans ................ . 
Oats ................... . 
Fertilizer and seed expenses IS 
Operating expenses ........ . 
Real estate expenses ....... . 
Labor, including hired ..... . 
Feeder cattle and hogs 
(receipts and expenses) 
Cash rent on hay and 
rotation pasture land14 
Receipts or expenses 
Tenant Landlord 
share (%) share (%) 
50 50 
50 50 
60 40 
50 50 
100 0 
o 100 
100 0 
100 o 
A.. Same as Ai except that, for each rotation and fertilizer 
level, the landlord receives a sufficiently large cash rent on 
hay and pasture land to give him a return equal to that 
received from his most profitable rotation (where the capi-
tal of the landlord is not limiting). 
A.. Same as Ai except that the tenant pays all fertilizer and 
seed expenses. 
A •. ' 
Item 
All grain crops .......... .. 
Value of hay or pasture' • ... . 
Fertilizer and seed expenses .. 
Operating expenses 
(including hired labor) ... . 
Real estate expenses ...... . 
Labor (operator labor) ..... . 
Feeder cattle and hogs 
(receipts and expenses) .... 
Receipts or expenses 
Tenant Landlord 
share (%) share (%) 
50 50 
50 50 
50 50 
50 50 
50 50 
100 0 
100 0 
A.. Same as Ai except that the landlord allows no livestock 
production by the tenant. 
TYPICAL LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASE 
Receipts or expenses 
Item Tenant Landlord 
share (%) share (%) 
Livestock receipts ......... . 50 50 
Investment in livestock 
and livestock equipment .. 50 50 
Livestock expenses ........ . 
Crop receipts (if any) ...... . 
Fertilizer and seed ........ . 
50 50 
50 50 
50 50 
Operating expenses 
(including hired labor) ... . 
Real estate expenses ....... . 
Labor (operator) .......... . 
100 0 
o 100 
100 0 
13Landlord furnishes all of the grass and legume seed while tenant 
furnishes all of the seed oats. 
"Cash rents on hay of $10, $16 and $25 per aCre are studied. 
'"It is assumed that the tenant purchases the landlord's share of the 
hay and pasture at the market price for hay. 
CASH LEASE 
Receipts or expenses 
Item Tenant Landlord 
share (%) share (%) 
Real estate expenses ....... . 
All other receipts and 
o 100 
expenses I6 ............. . 100 o 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This section presents the most profitable farm 
plans, as determined by the linear programming tech-
nique, for the landlord and tenant under various leas-
ing and resource situations. Major emphasis is placed 
upon the conflict of interests or divergence of plans 
which arises between landlord and tenant because of 
leasing restrictions and capital limitations. 
The method of presentation will consist of sepa-
rately discussing each type of lease analyzed in this 
study. The discussion of each lease will be further di-
vided into sections dealing with situations in (a) the 
Clarion-Webster soil area and (b) the Tama-Musca-
tine soil area. Within each soil area the most profit-
able landlord and tenant fann plans for various levels 
of capital will be considered. An attempt will be made 
to explain divergencies or consistences which occur 
between landlord and tenant plans when leasing 
arrangements and capital levels are allowed to vary. 
Since two soil areas have been used to determine 
whether lease arrangements cause differences between 
localities, comparisons between soil areas will also 
be made where such comparisons appear useful. 
CROP-SHARE LEASE Al 
Lease Al is the typical crop-share lease outlined 
earlier. In the discussion which follows, a cash rent of 
$10 per acre is assumed for hay and rotation pasture 
land. The results of increasing the cash rental to $16 
and $25 per acre also are presented. 
Clarion-Webster soil area. Table 7 summarizes the 
most profitable landlord and tenant plans under 
typical crop-share lease Al for various combinations 
of landlord and tenant capital levels. The plans pre-
sented in table 7 are based on a $10 per acre cash rent 
on hay and rotation pasture. With very limited capi-
tal ($500 under A and B in table 7) under crop-share 
lease At, the landlord would be unable to pay his 
share of the expenses necessary for planting the entire 
farm in a crop rotation. Therefore, he would find it 
most profitable to select the rotation and the fertilizer 
level which gives him the highest return per dollar 
invested. Accordingly, the landlord's optimum pro-
gram would be 130 acres of CCSb without fertilizer 
( CCSbl ) with 23 acres remaining unplanted or in 
"disposal land." Inclusion of disposal land in the pro-
gram, however, does not necessarily mean that a por-
tion of the farm would remain idle. In practice, dis-
posal land would probably be hay or pasture land 
(seeded in a previous year) for which the landlord 
would likely charge a cash rent. 
"Landlord receives a fixed cash rent for the entire fann. 
943 
TABLE 7. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER 'TYPICAL 
CROP-SHARE LEASE Ale, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant', 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level t disposal calved 
Party ( dollars) CCSbl CCSb. CCOM. CSbCOMa land* (no.) 
hogs'"· 
(litters ) Relumtt (dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 130 i47 (Tenant 3,000 
B(Landlord 500 130 
"is (Tenant 10,000 
C(Landlord 1,200 153 
(Tenant 3,000 147 
D(Landlord 1,200 153 
(Tellant 10,000 15 
E(Landlord 2,000 153 
(Tenant 3,000 147 
F(Landlord 2,000 153 
(Tellant 10,000 15 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 153 (Tellant 3,000 147 
H~Landlord Unlimiting 153 
Tellant 10,000 15 
·With $10 per acre cash rellt on hay and rotation pasture. 
fCapital available for use in the farm business. 
23 
II 
" "0 iS2 23 
II 
" '6 iS2 
II 
" "6 iS2 
H 
" "6 i/32 
"40 "io 
"40 "i6 
"40 "i6 
"40 "i6 
2,854 
2,242 
2,854 
4,397 
4,331 
2,242 
4,331 
4,397 
4,331 
2,242 
4,331 
4,397 
4,331 
2,242 
4,331 
4,397 
Un practice, the disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
§Choice steer calves, full-fed on pasture" 
.. OTotal litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters)" 
ttRetum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. Cash rellt On hay is not yet deducted from tbe tenant's return. 
The tenant's most profitable program with $3,000 
capital (A in table 7) is 147 acres of CCSba with 6 
acres in disposal land. Thus, when the tenant has 
$3,000 and the landlord has $500 to invest in the 
year's cropping program (A in table 7), the same 
rotation is optimum for the two but a difference 
arises in the level of fertilization which is optimum. 
The landlord prefers the first level of fertilization 
(no commercial fertilizer) while the tenant prefers 
the third level. 
It may at first appear to be more profitable for the 
tenant, as would be the case for an owner-operator 
with very limited funds, to plant the entire 153 crop 
acres to CCSb and fertilize some of the acres at a 
rate lower than the third level. However, the tenant's 
position can be explained as follows: Under the 
typical crop-share lease the tenant pays 50 percent of 
the fertilizer cost and receives 50 percent of the in-
crease in crop yields; he pays 100 percent of the oper-
ating expenses (except seed) needed for growing the 
crops, but receives only 50 percent of the crop yields. 
Therefore, the tenant receives a relatively high return 
on fertilizer as compared with the return from grow-
i~g the crops. 
This reasoning shows why the tenant with very 
limited capital maximizes his net return by using his 
limited capital in applying heavier rates of fertilizer 
and planting fewer acres (A in table 7). Conversely, 
this same reasoning shows why the landlord, if he is 
to maximize profits, should reject fertilizer use until 
the more profitable alternative of putting the entire 
farm into rotation has been exploited. The landlord 
pays little of the cost but gets half of the product 
in the normal field operations in growing crops; he 
receives half of the yield increase from fertilizer but 
also must pay half of the cost of fertilizer. (The land-
lord's share of the seed is far less than half of the cost 
of growing the crops.) 
When the landlord's capital is increased to $1,200 
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or more, his most profitable plan is CCSbs for the 
entire farm (C through H in table 7). The landlord 
maximizes profits by specifying the CCSb rotation 
because it has a higher per-acre net return than the 
CSbCOM and CCOM rotations when cash rent on 
hay is $10 per acre. Relatively lower incomes for the 
landlord from the meadow rotations can be attributed 
primarily to (a) the presence of oats (a low income 
crop) in the rotation and (b) a low return on hay 
when it has a cash rent of only $10 per acre. Fertil-
izer use is not extended beyond the third rate, be-
cause the added cost of the fourth rate of fertilizer 
is greater than the added returns from the increased 
yields under the price relationships used. Decreasing 
net returns for the fourth fertilizer rate are found for 
all three rotations in the Clarion-Webster soil area. 
A greater conflict in optimum plans arises when the 
tenant's capital is increased to $10,000 and the land-
lord's capital for annual expenses remains at $500 
(B in table 7). Whereas the optimum cropping pro-
gram is 130 acres of CCSb1 for the landlord, it is 
primarily CSbCOMs for the tenant. The tenant's 
most profitable plan with $10,000 capital includes a 
large proportion of the meadow rotations to support 
a sizeable livestock program (B in table 7).17 From 
the tenant's standpoint, the capital requirements and 
the net returns per acre of the meadow rotations with 
livestock are higher than the capital requirements 
and the net returns per acre from cash crop rotations 
such as CCSb. Returns per dollar invested, however, 
are highest under the CCSb cash crop rotation. 
As noted earlier, with only $3,000 capital (A in 
table 7) the tenant engages in the CCSb rotation 
where returns on capital are highest. With $10,000 
capital (B in table 7), however, the tenant maximizes 
17It is assumed throughout the study that the hay requiremellts ot 
the livestock enterprises must be supplied by the quantity of forage pro-
duced On the farm, i.e", no bay Or pasture is purchased or rented in the 
situations considered. 
his over-all return (i.e., to both capital and labor) 
by investing in livestock and meadow rotations, even 
though these activities bring lower returns on capital 
than the CCSb rotation. Hence, if the landlord speci-
fies the optimum program for himself under B in 
table 7, it will depress profits to the tenant who needs 
meadow for his livestock. Similarly, if the tenant 
specifies his optimum program, it will depress profits 
to the landlord who receives a low return on the hay 
produced. 
When the capital of the landlord is increased to 
$1,200 and the capital of the tenant is restricted to 
$3,000 (C in table 7), the cropping and fertilization 
plan for the two parties are almost identical. The 
landlord's greater funds allow him to invest in the 
third level of fertilization; the tenant's restricted 
capital position causes a cash crop rotation with a 
high level of fertilization to be more profitable than 
a forage rotation for livestock. However, an increase 
in the tenant capital level to $10,000, while the land-
lord capital level remains at $1,200, causes the opti-
mum plans (D in table 7) to again diverge: It be-
comes more profitable for the tenant to use a forage 
rotation which can be converted to a greater return 
through livestock; the landlord maximizes profit with 
heavy fertilization of a strictly grain rotation, since 
he does not gain from conversion of forage to live-
stock products. Similarly, when the tenant has limited 
capital while the landlord has unlimiting capital (G 
in table" 7), the two plans are again quite parallel. 
However, as the tenant's capital is increased to $10,000 
(H in table 7), the plans of the two parties again 
become divergent. 
Differentials, then, in relative amounts of capital 
for tenant and landlord under a crop-share lease can 
cause optimum plans for the two parties to be quite 
different. It is apparent from table 7 that the tenant 
and landlord programs are most nearly parallel when 
the tenant is limited to $3,000 capital while the land-
lord has $1,200 or more of capital (C, E and G in 
table 7). The most serious conflict of interests occurs 
when the landlord has only $500 capital while the 
tenant has $10,000 c~pital (B in table 7). Hence, it 
appears that, unless landlord and tenant have approxi-
mately the same relative capital limitations, a crop-
share lease cannot be found which gives a single best 
plan for both leasing parties and for the farm (i.e., 
the maximum profit plan such as that indicated at 
Q1 in figs. 1 and 2). 
The above plans have been computed for a typical 
crop-share lease with a $10 per acre cash rent on hay 
and rotation pasture. Since considerable variation in 
hay rentals may be found in the areas studied, opti-
mum plans also were computed for a typical crop-
share lease with the hay rent increased to $16 and 
$25 per acre. Details of ,these plans may be found 
in table B-1, Appendix B. The optimum landlord and 
tenant plans were exactly the same for a crop-share 
lease with $16 and $25 per acre cash rent on hay and 
pasture. These plans also differed only slightly from 
the optimum plans for each party when the rent was 
$10 per acre. The $25 hay rental was still too low to 
discourage the tenant from entering into a livestock 
program built around a meadow rotation; it was also 
too low to induce the landlord to change from CCSb 
to a meadow rotation. 
Tama-Muscatine soil area. Table 8 summarizes the 
most profitable landlord and tenant programs under 
typical crop-share lease A1 for various levels of land-
lord and tenant capital. A' cash rent of $10 per acre 
is assumed for hay and rotation pasture. In the Tama-
Muscatine soil area, as in the Clarion-Webster soil 
area, the CCSb rotation yields (a) the greatest re-
turn per dollar invested for both the landlord and 
tenant, and (b) the highest net return per acre of 
rotation at the higher rates of fertilization for the 
landlord. IS Thus, with only $500 capital (A and B 
laThe tenant's retum per acre is highest, of course, when he is allowed 
to have livestock with the meadow rotations. 
TABLE 8. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER TYPICAL 
CROP-SHARE LEASE Al·, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level t dis~oSal calved hogs·· Retumtt 
Party (dollars) CCSb, CCSb. CCSbi CCSb. CSbCOM. CCOM. and~ (no.) (litters) (dollars) 
A (Landlord 500 129 
"78 25 4,058 (Tenant 3,000 76 3,699 
B(Landlord 500 129 iSG "is 25 "40 "i2 4,058 (Tenant 10,000 5,867 
C(Landlord 1,200 
'7S 106 48 5,903 (Tenant 3,000 76 3,699 
D(Landlord 1,200 106 48 iSB "is "40 'i2 5,903 (Tenant 10,000 5,867 
E(Landlord 2,000 
'7S "76 154 6,055 (Tenant 3,000 3,699 
F(Landlord 2,000 154 
'is '40 'i2 6,055 (Tenant 10,000 136 5,867 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 
"7S '76 154 6,055 (Tenant 3,000 3,699 
H(Landlord Unlimiting 154 
'40 'i2 6,055 (Tenant 10,000 136 18 5,867 
.With $10 per acre cash rent on hay and rotation pasture. 
tCapital available for use in the farm business, 
Un J.rnctice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture, 
ID erred-fed steer calves, good to choice grade • 
•• Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters), 
ttRetum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted, Cash rent on hay is not yet deducted from the tenant's retum, 
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in table 8), the landlord's most profitable plan is 129 
acres of CCSb without fertilizer (i.e., CCSb1 with 25 
acres in disposal land). As the landlord's capital is 
increased to $1,200 (C and D in table 8), his optimum 
plan is the entire farm planted to CCSb; 106 acres 
receive the third rate of fertilization, and 48 acres 
receive the fourth rate of fertilization. With $2,000 
or more in capital (E, F, G and H in table 8), the 
landlord plants the entire farm (154 crop acres) to 
CCSb and fertilizes at the highest rate, if he is to 
maximize profits. 
One minor difference between the two soil areas 
should be noted at this point. It was observed above 
that a change from the third to the fourth level of 
fertilization in the Clarion-Webster soil area decreases 
net returns. However, in the Tama-Muscatine soil 
area, the marginal yield from the fourth level of fer-
tilizer is great enough to increase net returns. Thus, 
with sufficient capital, the fourth rate of fertilization 
is profitable in the Tama-Muscatine soil area. 
When the tenant's capital is limited to $3,000 (A, 
table 8), his most profitable program is 78 acres of 
CCSb2 and 76 acres of CCSb3 • Hence, at a low capi-
tal level for both tenant and landlord (A in table 8), 
the separate plans call for the same rotation but differ-
ent levels of fertilization. It is most profitable for the 
landlord, with only $500 to spend on seed and fer-
tilizer costs, to get as many acres as possible planted 
to row crops without fertilizer, rather than to plant 
fewer acres and fertilize at a high rate. The reason is 
that explained earlier: The landlord pays only a small 
fraction of the cost of planting, growing and harvest-
ing the yield of an unfertilized acre, but he receives 
half of the yield; he reccives half of the yield from 
fertilizer, but also must pay half of the cost. For a 
limited capital level, the tenant gets a relatively 
higher return on the yield from fertilizer since he 
pays only half of the fertilizer cost and receives half 
of the increase in yield; on an unfertilized acre, the 
tenant pays the majority of the cost, but still receives 
only half of the yield. 
The optimum plans for the two parties differ even 
more when the tenant's capital is increased to $10,000 
and the landlord's capital remains restricted to $500 
(B in table 8). The tenant's profit maximizing plan 
then includes 136 acres of CSbCOM4 and 18 acres 
of CCOM4 with 40 deferred-fed steer calves and 12 
litters of pigs per year. The landlord maximizes profits 
with a grain rotation (129 acres in CCSb1 ) since he 
gains none of the product from forage fed to live-
stock; the tenant maximizes profits with a rotation 
containing forage since he does realize this gain 
when he has sufficient capital for livestock. Because 
of the restrictions on the space available for hogs, 
no more than 12 litters per year can be raised under 
the two-litter system considered. Thus, hog building 
space, as well as capital and land, become limiting 
resources at a $10,000 tenant capital level. 
In the Tama-Museatine soil area, the tenant with 
$10,000 capital prefers rotations of eCOM and 
CSbCOM fertilized at the highest rates (table 8). 
Even at the highest levels of capital, the optimum 
landlord plan never includes a rotation with meadow, 
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although the highest level of fertilization is attained. 
Hence, it should be repeated: The typical crop-share 
lease brings about inconsistent plans and, thus, re-
sults in inefficient tenure arrangements when tenant 
and landlord have different relative capital limitations. 
Of course, the landlord can specify a. leasing re-
striction, or the two parties can include a clause in the 
lease which guarantees that a single cropping and 
fertilization plan is used. However, even though this 
single plan is used, it does not allow the most effi-
cient use of the total farm resources as long as a 
different plan would allow one of the persons to have 
a greater income (see discussion of figs. 1 and 2). 
Neither will this "agreed upon plan" result in the 
maximum income to the farm firm described by the 
designated collection of resources: Other plans can 
be found which permit a greater income with each 
party receiving a greater absolute profit. 
The greatest consistency of landlord and tenant 
plans for Tama-Muscatine soils occurs when both 
parties arc limited on capital (A and C in table 8). 
When both parties have larger amounts of capital, 
the optimum plans diverge because the crop-share 
lease, under which the tenant is allowed to produce 
livestock, causes the production possibility curves 
for the tenant and/or landlord to have slopes differ- . 
ing from the slope of the production possibility curve 
for the farm as a whole. For example, if axis A in fig. 
2 refers to livestock and axis B refers to c~ops, pp' 
is the production possibility curve for the farm as a 
whole. However, the production possibility curve for 
the landlord is identical with the B axis; the curve for 
the tenant runs from point P' to point D (curve PID 
is not drawn in fig. 2). With this distortion of the pro-
duction possibility curve for the tenant and landlord 
relative to that for the farm as a whole, optimum 
plans for each party will be changed accordingly. 
Optimum plans were also computed for the typical 
crop-share lease where cash rents on hay were in-
creased to $16 and $25 per acre in the Tama-Musca-
tine soil area. These optimum plans do not differ 
from the plans for the crop-share lease with $10 per 
acre hay rent shown in table 8. Hence, it appears 
that adjusting the cash rental on hay and pasture be-
tween $10 and $25 per acre does nothing to resolve 
the difference in optimum plans for the two parties 
under a typical crop-share lease. This same conclu-
sion was reached for the Clarion-Webster soil area. 
CROP-SHARE LEASE A2 
Increasing the cash rent on hay and pasture to $25 
per acre does not cause the landlord and tenant plans 
to be consistent under a crop-share lease where the 
tenant receives the full return from livestock. Hence, 
this question arises: What level of cash rent will 
cause a meadow rotation, which is best for the tenant's 
livestock program, to be most profitable for the land-
lord who does not realize part of the livestock re-
turn? To answer this question, the situations for 
lease A2 have been included. 
Lease A2 is a typical crop-share lease with the fol-
lowing important exception: From each rotation and 
fertilizer level the landlord receives a sufficiently large 
cash rent on hay and pasture to give him a return 
per acre of rotation equal to that received from his 
most profitable rotation (i.e., when the landlord is 
assumed to have at least $2,000 available for use in 
the farm business). Lease A2 is devised to insure 
that the two leasing parties will find the same plan to 
be optimum. Regardless of the plan chosen by the 
tenant, this same plan should be satisfactory to the 
landlord since he receives an equal net return per 
acre from all rotations and fertilization levels.19 
Clarion-Webster soil area. In the Clarion-Webster 
soil area, the most profitable rotation for the landlord 
(when cash rents on hay range from $10 to $25 per 
acre) is CCSba• Cash rents on hay ra~ging from 
$39.85 to $48.65 per acre are needed to raise the land-
lord's returns per acre from the meadow rotations to 
the level of his returns from the CCSba rotation. 
Table 9 summarizes the most profitable programs 
for the landlord and tenant at various capital levels 
under crop-share lease A2 (typical crop-share lease 
with equal returns to the landlord from all rotations). 
With only a $3,000 capital level, the tenant's optimum' 
program is 147 acres of CCSbs with 6 acres in dis-
posal land, while the landlord's optimum program is 
153 acres of CCSba (A in table 9). However, when the 
tenant's capital level is $3,132 or more (B and C in 
table 9) the landlord and tenant can reach complete 
agreement, i.e., the landlord is indifferent between 
CCSbs and any of the meadow rotations (ignoring 
the slight differences in capital requirements noted 
above). It is interesting to observe that the tenant's 
optimum program with $10,000 under lease A2 
(table 9) qiffers only slightly from the tenant's opti-
mum program for lease Al (table 7) when the cash 
rent on hay is only $10 per acre. Apparently the ten-
ant is able to pay a rather high price on hay for the 
opportunity to engage in livestock enterprises. The 
acreage of meadow for ~he tenant's optimum plan 
with $10,000 under lease A2 is quite small; approxi-
mately 28 acres for a 160-acre farm. The total cash 
rent required thus would be only about $1,120 for 
the farm. Many landlords charge this total amount of 
cash rent for "privilege" rent or as rent on buildings, 
lots and hay. Whether the tenant could be induced 
lOIn the following discussion the differences in landlord capital re-
quirements for the various rotations will be ignored; presumably the 
landlord will prefer the rotation with the lowest capital requirement, 
to pay such a high rental under all conditions is some-
what doubtful. 
An alternative to paying the high rent on hay would 
be for the tenant to engage in some form of drylot 
livestock enterprise, such as hogs, with the farm in a 
CCSb rotation. Actually, many landlords restrict their 
tenant from producing hay and hence allow only dry-
lot hog production. A major income effect of the high 
cash rent on hay is to decrease profits to the tenant 
and to increase profits to the landlord. 
In interpreting the income figures in all tables, the 
following point should be remembered: The arrange-
ments examined in this study are in terms of leasing 
and resource efficiency and not in terms of an equi-
table distribution of the income of a particular magni-
tude. It is possible that the relative income division 
might be equitable but that the lease is not efficient 
in terms of the resource and total income conditions 
outlined earlier. In the case where a new leasing 
arrangement brings about resource efficiency but dis-
torts the pattern of income division, other adjust-
ments could be made to restore the previous levels 
of tenant and landlord income. 
Tama-Muscatine soil area. In the Tama-Muscatine 
soil area, the most profitable rotation for the land-
lord (when cash rents on hay range from $10 to $25 
per acre) is CCSb4 • Cash rents ranging from $72.60 
to $89.85 per acre are needed to bring about equal 
returns to the landlord from the CCSb4 and meadow 
rotations. Table 10 indicates that with only $3,000 
the tenant is too limited on capital to reach the 
landlord's optimum plan of 154 acres of CCSb4; the 
tenant's optimum plan includes 78 acres of CCSb2 
and 76 acres of CCSba (A in table 10). However, 
with $3,532 or more in capital for the tenant the leas-
ing partners once again can reach full agreement on 
the plan to be followed (B and C in table 10). 
One important difference is apparent between the 
two soil areas studied. In the Clarion-Webster soil 
area, as pointed out earlier, the optimum programs 
for the tenant with $10,000 capital are almost identi-
cal, regardless of the level of cash rent charged on 
hay (compare C, table 9 and H, table 7). In the 
Tama-Muscatine soil area, however, the tenant's opti-
mum program with $10,000 capital changes greatly 
at the high cash rent level (compare C, table 10 and 
TABLE 9. MOST PROF1TABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARI!: 
Party 
A(LandlordU 
(Tenant 
B (LandlordU 
(Tenant 
C(LandlordU 
(Tenant 
LEASE A.o, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Capital level f (dollars) CCSb. 
2,000 ' 153 
3,000 147 
2,000 153 
3,132 153 
2.000 14 
10,000 14 
Acres of rotation 
CSbCOM3 
disposal 
landt 
, '0 
139 
139 
Tenant·s 
livestock program 
calves§ hogsOO 
(no. ) (litters ) 
'ici 
Returntf (dollars) 
4,331 
2,242 
4,331 
2,333 
4,331 
3,293 
O"Typical" crop-share lease except that for each rotation and fertilizer level the landlord receives a sufficiently large cash rent on hay and pasture to 
give him a return equal to that received from his most profitable rotation (C;CSb.). 
fCapital available for use in the farm business. 
Un practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
§Choice steer calves, full-fed on pasture. 
OOTotal litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
H Return above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
UUnder this lease, the landlord receives an equal net return from each rotation. However, he will probably prefer that rotation which has the lowest 
capital requirement. 
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TABLE 10. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE A.o, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Acres of rotation 
Tenant's 
livestock program 
hogst 
(litters) Party 
Capital level t 
( dollars) CCSb. 
A( Landlordoo 2,000 
·78 (Tenant 3,000 
B (Landlord 00 2,00U 
(Tenant 3,531! 
C(Landlordoo 2,OOU 
(Tenant 10,000 
CCSba CCSb. 
·76 154 
154 
154 
147 
147 
CSbCOM. 
7 
7 ·iil 
Retum§ 
(dollars) 
6,055 
3,699 
6,055 
3,932 
6,055 
4,332 
OTypical crop-share lease except that for each rotation and fertilizer level the landlord receives a sufficiently large cash rent on hay and pasture to 
give him a return equal to that received from his most profitable rotation (l.:CSb.). 
fCapital available for uSe in the farm business. 
:Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
fRetum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
oOUnder this lease, the landlord receives an equal net return from each rotation. However, he will probably prefer the rotation which has the lowest 
capital requirement. 
H, table 8). The major change in the tenant's pro-
gram, resulting from the high rent on hay, is a shift 
away from the meadow rotations and cattle to less 
lPeadow in the rotation and only hogs in the livestock 
program. This change in the tenant's optimum plan 
can be explained as follows: Since, in the Tama-
Muscatine soil area, the grain yields from the CCSb4 
rotation are nearly as high as the grain yields from the 
CSbCOM and CCOM rotations, an extremely high 
rent on meadow is needed for the landlord to be in-
different between CCSb4 and the meadow rotations. 
It is not profitable for the tenant to pay this high cash 
rent in order to carry on the cattle enterprise. 
The crop-shar.e lease just discussed (equal landlord 
returns from all rotations) allows both parties to 
.adopt the same optimum program, providing the ten-
ant has at least enough capital to put the entire farm 
into the landlord's most profitable rotation (CCSba in 
the Clarion-Webster soil area; CCSb4 in the Tama-
Muscatine soil area). However, the cash rental rates 
on hay which would be needed to bring the landlord 
equal returns from all rotations are far above cus-
tomary rental rates and would probably be viewed 
as "unfair" by tenants and landlords alike.20 Perhaps a 
more practical approach toward bringing the landlord 
and tenant together would be to include a compromise 
on hay rental rates with some other "offsetting" ar-
rangement; or to permit the alternative of drylot 
livestock activities, such as drylot hog system. Such 
alternatives would permit the tenant to raise livestock 
without demanding meadow in the rotation. It is 
possible, however, that the meadow-livestock activities 
would out-compete the drylot livestock activities even 
with the extremely high hay prices assumed under 
crop-share lease A2 (equal landlord returns from all 
rotations). The possibility of drylot feeding, in rela-
tion to pasture and forage production with high cash 
rental rates, has not been studied. 
In the two soil areas studied, the cash rents on hay 
must be extended to relatively high levels before 
the landlord finds it profitable to adopt a meadow ro-
tation (and hence bring about consistency in plans 
for the landlord and tenant). It should be recognized, 
•• A leasing arrangement also was considered for which the cash rental 
rate for all rotations was based on the second most profitable landlord 
rotation. It was expected that this lease might reduce the cash rental 
rnte ne .. ded to brinll the landlord and tenant to consistent plans. How-
ever, this change in cash rental did not mOVe either the landlord or the 
tenant from the "comers" of the production possihility curves which 
were optimum for each under the typical crop-share lease. 
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however, that these relationships assume that the al-
ternative of heavy fertilization is available. Thus, 
grain yields are maintained at high levels with a rela-
tively low percentage of hay in the rotation (or with 
no hay in the case of CCSb). If only low fertilization 
rates are available, however, grain yields are main-
tained at relatively higher levels iq the rotations con-
taining a larger proportion of meadow. Hence, when 
lower fertilization rates are assumed, a much lower 
cash rental rate on hay is needed to induce the land-
lord to adopt a meadow rotation and thereby permit 
leasing efficiency. When hay is complementary with 
grain over some range, the landlord can increase 
profits by raising at least a complementary amount of 
hay. 
CROP-SHARE LEASE As 
Lease As is a typical crop-share lease except that 
the tenant pays all fertilizer and seed costs instead of 
half of the cost of these items. Since this particular 
cost sharing arrangement is a common variation of the 
typical crop-share lease, it is examined here to de-
termine the effects upon the optimum plans of the two 
parties.21 
Clarion-Webster soil area. Table 11 summarizes the 
most profitable plans for the landlord and tenant 
under crop-share lease Aa (tenant pays all the seed 
and fertilizer costs) with various levels of capital for 
the landlord and tenant. A cash rent on hay of $16 
per acre is assumed for the plans in table 11. The 
landlord's optimum program at all capital levels is 
now 153 acres of CCSb at the highest rate of fertili-
zation (CCSb4 ). As noted previously, the added cost 
of the fourth level of fertilization for the Clarion-
Webster soil area is greater than the added return 
from the increase in yields. It is, with the prices used, 
an uneconomic level of fertilization even on an owner-
operated farm. However, because the landlord pays 
no fertilizer or seed expenses but receives half of the 
increase in returns under the present lease, he finds 
21 Division of the soybeans on a 40-60, instead of a 50-50 basis be-
tween the landlord and the tenant is another common variation of the 
typical crop.lIhare lease which was examined. The resulting plans for the 
Clarion-Webster soil area (with $25 hay rental per acre) were exactly 
the same as the plans where soybeans were divided on a 50-50 basis 
(see table B-1, Appendix B). The plans for the 40-80 arrangement on 
soyl?eans in the Tama-Muscatine soil area were also the same as for the 
typIcal crop-share lease (table 7), except for a slight shift toward more 
soybeans in the rotation at the $10,000 tenant capital level. For detnils 
of these plans, See table B-2, Appendix B. 
the fourth level of fertilization to be optimum even 
though this level of fertilization is uneconomic for the 
farm as a whole. 
The tenant's most profitable plan with $3,000 in 
capital is now 65 acres of CCSb1 and 88 acres of 
CCSb2 (A in table 11). When seed and fertilizer ex-
penses are shared 50-50 (see A in table 7) the tenant 
finds it most profitable to fertilize fewer acres (147 
acres) at a higher rate and leave 6 acres in disposal 
land. When the tenant must pay all fertilizer and seed 
costs, the above plan is no longer most profitable be-
cause the tenant loses his relative advantage in fer-
tilizer use; he must now pay all fertilizer and seed 
expenses while receiving only 50 percent of the return. 
When the tenant's capital is increased to $10,000 
under the present lease (e.g., see B, table 11) his 
most profitable plan is only slightly different from his 
optimum plan with $10,000 when fertilizer and seed 
expenses are divided on a 50~50 basis (see B, table 
7). The major change in the tenant's plan is that fer-
tilizer use now extends only to the first and second 
levels instead of to the third level of application. Be-
cause the tenant's costs are increased to include all 
fertilizer and seed expenses under the present lease, 
such a result is quite reasonable. 
Plans were also computed for crop-share lease As 
(where the tenant pays all seed and fertilizer ex-
penses) with the cash rent on hay increased to $25 
per acre. However, the increase in rent did not alter 
the optimum plans for the landlord and tenant from 
those with a $16 per acre rent on hay (see discussion 
in the previous paragraphs and the results in table 
11). 
Tama-Muscatine soil area. Table 12 indicates the 
optimum plans for the landlord and tenant under 
crop-share lease A3 (where the tenant pays all fer-
tilizer and seed costs) with various levels of capital. 
Once again a cash rent of $16 per acre on hay is 
assumed. As in the Clarion-Webster soil area, the 
cost-sharing arrangement under the present lease 
allows the landlord's most profitable plan at all capital 
levels to be a CCSb! rotation for the entire farm 
(table 12). 
Table 12 shows that the increased per-acre cost 
for the tenant under lease A3 forces a restriction on 
fertilizer use at both the $3,000 and $10,000 capital 
levels. Under the usual 50-50 sharing of fertilizer and 
seed expenses, the tenant with $3,000 capital can fer-
tilize at the second and third levels on CCSb (see A, 
table 8). Under the present cost-sharing arrangement, 
however, the tenant can fertilize only 72 acres of 
CCSb at the second level, with the remaining acreage 
receiving no fertilizer (A in table 12). A similar re-
striction of fertilizer use occurs when the tenant has 
$10,000 capital. Previously the tenant's optimum plan 
with $10,000 capital specified the highest level of fer-
tilizer use on the entire farm (see H, table 8); under 
the present lease, only the second level of fertilization 
is profitable (see H, table 12).22 
An increase in the tenant's expenses from 50 percent 
to 100 percent of the fertilizer and seed costs causes 
the gap between the most profitable programs for the 
landlord and tenant to widen. This shift in expenses 
causes the plans for the tenant and landlord to differ 
with respect to rates of fertilization, as well as to the 
rotation used. 
When the cash rent on hay is increased from $16 
to $25 per acre under the present lease" (Aa), no 
change in tenant plans occurs except for the $10,000 
capital level. The increase in hay rent causes a shift 
to less meadow in the rotation and thus reduces the 
cattle enterprise slightly. For details of these plans 
see table B-3, Appendix B. 
"In the Tama-Muscatine soil area a d .. licale h.lance, in tenns of profit-
ability, exists between tbe CCOM and CSbCOM rotations. For example, 
when the tenant has $10,000 in capital, a change from lease Al to A. 
(tenant's fertilizer and seed expenses increased from 50 percent to 100 
percent) shifts almost the entire farm from a CSbCOM to a CCOM rota-
tion (see B, table 8 and B, table 12). The shift occurs as a result ot 
slightly higber fertilizer and seed costs for the CSbCOM rotation. 
Despite this shift in rotation, the tenant's livestock program remains 
essentially unchanged between the two leases. 
TABLE 11. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE A.o, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level t calvest hogs§ RetumO O 
Party (dollars) CCSbl CCSb. CCSb. CSbCOM. (no.) (litters) (dollars ) 
A(Landlord 500 
'65 88 
153 5,301 (Tenant 3,000 1,452 
B(Landlord 500 153 
i45 'iii 5,30) (Tenant 10,000 8 38 3,743 
C(Landlord 1,200 
'65 '88 153 5,301 (Tenant 3,000 1,452 
D(LandIord 1,200 
, '8 153 145 'S8 
5,301 
(Tenant 10,000 10 3,743 
E(Landlord 2,000 
'65 88 
153 5,301 
(Tenant 3,000 1,452 
F(Landlord 2,000 
, '8 153 145 'iii 5,301 (Tenant 10,000 38 3,743 
G(LandIord Unlimiting 
'65 '88 
153 5,301 
(Tenant 3,000 1,452 
H(LandIord Unlimiting 153 
i45 'il8 5,301 (Tenant 10.000 8 10 3.743 
0Typical crop-share lease with $16 per acre cash rent on hay and pasture, except thnt tenant pays all fertiliZer and seed eXpenses, 
fCapital available for use in the fann business, 
tChoicc steer calves, full-fed on pasture, 
ITotal litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
OORetum above annual ,expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. Cash rent on hay is not yet deducted from tI,e tenant's return, 
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TABLE 12. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE As", WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level t calves; hogs§ Return"" 
Party (dollars) CCSbl CCSb. CCSb. CCOM. (no.) (litters ) (dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 
'82 '72 
154 7,109 
(Tenant 3,000 2,939 
B(Landlord 500 
"6 154 i48 '39 'i2 7,109 {Tenant 10,000 4,978 
C(Landlord 1,200 
'82 '72 
154 7,109 
(Tenant 3,000 2,939 
D~Landlord 1,200 
, '6 154 
'39 'i2 
7,109 
Tenant 10,000 14M 4,978 
E(Landlord 2,000 
'82 '72 
154 7,109 
(Tenant 3,000 2,939 
F{Landlord 2,000 
"6 154 i48 '39 'i2 7,109 {Tenant 10,000 4,978 
G{Landlord Unlimiting 
'82 '72 
154 7,109 
(Tenant 3,000 2,939 
H{Landlord Unlimiting 
"6 154 i48 '39 'i2 
7,109 
(Tenant 10,000 4,978 
"Typical crop-share lease with $16 per acre cash rent on hay and pasture, except that tenant pays all fertilizer and seed expenses, 
tCapital available for use in the fann business, 
tDeferred-fed steer calves, good to choice grade. 
§Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). ' . 
• "Retum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. Cash rent on hay is not yet deducted from the tenant's return. 
CROP-SHARE LEASE A4 
Lease A4 is a crop-share leasing arrangement 
sometimes suggested as an alternative to the more 
common orop-share arrangements. Under lease A4 
all crop expense (including operating and building 
expense) and crop production is divided equally be-
tween landlord and tenant. The tenant, however, re-
tains full ownership and responsibility for the live-
stock enterprises. According to the 50-50 division of 
the crop, the landlord receives half of the value of 
the hay and rotation pasture produced. It is assumed 
that the tenant purchases the landlord's share of the 
hay and rotation pasture at the market price for hay 
and uses this roughage in his livestock program. This 
arrangement is examined to determine whether giving 
the landlord and tenant identical production possi-
bility curves on crops causes consistent plans. How-
ever, in comparisons between crops and livestock, the 
tenant and landlord still are faced with different pro-
duction possibility curves (i.e., curves which have 
slopes differing from that for the farm as a whole). 
Clarion-Webster soil area. The major change in the 
present lease (A4) from a typical crop-share lease is 
that operating and building expenses are now divided 
on a 50-50 basis between landlord and tenant. Oper-
ating expenses are considerably greater than building 
expenses, hence, there is a shift in total expenses from 
the tenant to the landlord. Therefore, with very 
limited capital ($500, A in table 13), the landlord's 
optimum program contains only 43 acres of CCSb2 
with 110 acres in disposal larid. The landlord does 
not maximize profits by planting more than 43 acres 
TABLE 13. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE A<", WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Party 
Capital level t (dollars) CCSb. CCSb. CSbCOM. CCOM. 
disposal calves§ hogs"" Returntt 
land; (no.) (litters ) (dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 43 
i49 "4 
110 
"0 868 (Tenant 3,000 3,530 
B{Landlord 500 43 
i22 '3i 
110 
'40 868 (Tenant 10,000 10 4,750 
C(Landlord 1,200 104 
i49 "4 
49 2,082 (Tenant 3,000 6 3,530 
D~LandlOrd 1,200 104 i22 '3j 49 '46 'iii 2,082 Tenant 10,000 4,750 
E(Landlord 2,000 24 129 
"4 "6 3,372 {Tenant 3,000 149 3,530 
F(Landlord 2,000 24 129 
i22 '3i '46 
3,372 {Tenant 10,000 10 4,750 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 153 
'4 "6 3,430 {Tenant 3,000 149 3,530 
H~LandiOrd Unlimiting 153 i22 '3i '40 10 3,430 Tenant 10,000 4,750 
oReceipts and expenses on all crops are divided 50-50 between landlord and tcnant. 
tCapital available for uSe in the farm business. 
Un practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
§Choice ste"" calves, full-fed on pasture. 
HTotal litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
tt Return above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
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of CCSb without fertilizer because, for the Clarion-
Webster soil area, the initial yield response for fer-
tilizer is high enough to allow a slightly higher return 
per dollar invested under CCSb2 than under CCSb1• 
(The "net return/capital requirement" ratio per acre 
is greater for CCSb2 than for CCSb1• )28 With an in-
crease in the landlord capital level, more acres are 
planted to CCSb2 and CCSbs until, with unlimiting 
capital, the landlord's optimum program is once 
again CCSba for the entire farm (H in table 13). 
Because of the shift in expenses from the tenant to 
the landlord under the present leasing alternative 
(A4 ), it is possible for the tenant to plant the entire 
farm to rotation even with limited capital ($3,000, 
A in table 13). Such a plan for the tenant is not pos-
sible under the usual cost-sharing arrangement (see 
A in table 7). Also, with a high capital level, the 
tenant is able to produce more acres of the meadow 
rotations and maintain a larger livestock program than 
was possible under the common cost-sharing arrange-
ment (compare B, table 13 and B, table 7). 
For the Clarion-Webster soil area, the 50-50 method 
of sharing crop costs and returns (lease A4, table 13) 
is no more successful in reducing leasing frictions 
than the typical crop-share lease (table 7). In fact, 
if the landlord is very limited on capital and the 
tenant is not, the optimum programs for the two 
parties are more diverse than under a typical crop 
lease (compare B, table 13 and B, table 7). The shift 
in expenses toward the landlord does not change the 
landlord's optimum rotation from CCSb (B in tables 
7 and 13); the increased expense merely permits the 
landlord to plant a smaller acreage of this rotation. 
Reduced tenant expenses, on the other hand, allow the 
"The retum per dollar invested from the CCSb. rotation is so little 
higher than the retum per dollar invested from the CCSbl rotation that 
the difference is probably unimportant in practice. Also. the above re-
sults are applicable over a very narrow range of capital limitations. How-
ever. the results do indicate that under certaiu situations a landlord, or 
even an owner-operator, may receive greater returns per dollar invested 
from an acre of fertilized rotation than from an acre of unfertilized rota-
tion. 
tenant to proceed even further in the direction of 
more meadow in the rotation as a means of obtaining 
a profitable use of his capital through livestock pro-
duction (see B in tables 13 and 7). Hence, because 
the landlord does not receive a share of the livestock, 
the plans still do not become consistent: Equal pro-
duction possibilities for crops are attained but pro-
duction possibilities (see figs. 1 and 2) still differ 
between crops and livestock for the two parties.24 
A slight variation of the 50-50 cost-sharing arrange-
ment discussed above is also studied for the Clarion-
Webster soil area. Under this particular variation, the 
tenant pays $25 per acre cash rent on hay instead 
of half of the market value of hay. The details of 
the plans for this variation are given in table B-5, 
Appendix B. The only change from the plans under 
the 50-50 arrangement discussed above (see table 13) 
is for the low landlord capital levels: CSbCOM1 re-
places CCSb2 as the rotation with the highest land-
lord return per dollar invested. 
Tama-Muscatine soil area. Table 14 indicates the 
optimum plans for the landlord and tenant under 
crop-share lease A4 (with a 50-50 division of crop 
receipts and expenses) for the Tama-Muscatine soil 
area. The 50-50 cost-sharing arrangement of lease A4 , 
shifts more of the expenses to the landlord than is the 
case under the typical crop-share arrangement. Hence, 
with limited quantities of capital, the landlord is 
forced to leave more acres in disposal land than is 
necessary under the usual cost-sharing arrangement 
( compare A, B, C and D in tables 14 and 8). 
The decrease in tenant expenses under the 50-50 
cost-sharing arrangement allows the tenant with 
limited capital to use higher fertilizer rates than was 
possible under a typical crop-share lease (compare 
"Plans also were computed for an arrangement under which crop ex-
penses and receipts were divided on a 60-40 basis between the landlord 
and tenant. This arrangement caused greater divergence in plans than did 
the 50-50 sharing arrangement. For details of the plans under the 60-40 
sharing arrangement on Clarion-Webster soils, see table B-4, Appendix B. 
TABLE 14. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATlNE SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE At •• WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level f disposal calved hogs·· Returnff 
Party (<IoUars) CCSbl CCSb. CCSb. CCSb, CSbCOM, CCO:M. landt (no.) (litters) (dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 50 
"3 104 "4 1,272 (Tenant 3,000 151 5.144 
B(Landlord 500 50 
'39 iii; 104 '46 'i2 1,272 (Tenant 10,000 5.909 
C(Landlord 1,200 120 ii;i "3 34 "4 3,052 (Tenant 3,000 5.144 
, -I 
D~Landlord 1.200 120 
'39 iii; 34 'i2 3,052 Tenant 10.000 46 5,909 
E(Landlord 2,000 71 83 ii;i "3 "4 4,722 (Tenant 3,000 5,144 
F(Landlord 2.000 71 83 
, 39 iii; '46 'i2 4,722 (Tenant 10,000 5,909 
G{Landlord Unlhnlting 154 
"3 "4 5.013 (Tenant 3,000 151 5,144 
H(Landlord Unlimiting 154 
'39 iii; '.i6 'i2 5,013 (Tenant 10,000 5,909 
0Receipts and expenses on all crop. are divided 50-50 between landlord and tenant. 
tCapital available for use in the farm business. 
Un r.ractice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
~De erred-fed steer calves, good to choice grade. 
OOTotal litters per year (equal numbers of .pring and fall litters). 
ff Return above annual expenses. with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
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A, table 14 and A, table 8). The 50-50 cost-sharing 
arrangement allows the tenant with $10,000 capital 
to plant more areas of meadow and raise more live-
stock than was possible under the typical crop-share 
lease (compare B, table 14 and B, table 8)., 
From the above discussion, it appears that chang-
ing from a typical crop-share lease to crop-share 
lease A4 (50-50 division of crop returns and ex-
penses) consistently widens the gap between the 
most profitable programs for the landlord and tenant 
in both soil areas. The shift in expenses from the ten-
ant to the landlord forces the landlord's optimum 
program in the direction of lower fertilizer levels on 
the CCSb rotation; simultaneously it allows the tenant 
to maximize profits by engaging in a heavy livestock 
program requiring meadow rotations fertilized at high 
levels. While crop-share lease A4 (with 50-50 division 
of crop expenses and returns) attains consistency of 
production possibilities between crops, it apparently 
widens the nature of production possibilities between 
crops and livestock for both tenant and landlord. The 
tenant gains more than previously from meadow ro-
tations; the landlord still gains nothing from forage 
processed through livestock' and has more pressure 
f)n his limited capital.25 
As for the Clarion-Webster soil area, a slight varia-
tion of the 50-50 cost-sharing arrangement is also 
studied for the Tama-Muscatine soil area. With this 
leasing variation, the tenant pays a cash rent of $25 
per acre on hay instead of half of the market value of 
the hay. The optimum plans for the tenant and land-
lord with this leasing variation are exactly the same 
as the plans for the 50-50 cost-sharing arrangement 
(see table 14 for these plans). Apparently, both the 
landlord and tenant are located at the "corners" of 
discontinuous production possibility curves: Small 
changes in price ratios (due to slightly changing the 
value of hay above) are not great enough to cause 
the iso-revenue lines to be tangent to the production 
possibility curves' at different points for given capi-
tal levels (see discussion of figs. 1 and 2).26 
CROP-SHARE LEASE A" 
Under all previous leases the tenant is allowed to 
"Plans also were computed for an arrangement under which crop 
expenses lind receipts were divided on a 60-40 basis between the landlord 
and tenant. As in the Clarion-Webster soil area, this arrangement caused 
greater divergence in plans than did the 50-50 sharing arrangement. For 
details of the plans under the 60-40 sharing arrangement for the Tama-
Muscatine soil area, see table B-a, Appendix B. 
'SAlso see Heady, Economics of agricultural production and resource 
use, op. cit. p. 255-6. 
operate an independent livestock program. However, 
in all of the leasing variations examined, changes to 
cause tenant and landlord production possibilities for 
crops to be similar does not bring about complete 
consistency of plans (see discussion of figs. 1 and 2). 
This.is true because differences in production possi-
bilities between crops and livestock are still different 
for the tenant and landlord, or for each party as 
compared to the farm as a whole (see discussion 
under typical crop-share lease At). Since the land-
lord does not realize part of the gain in value of the 
forage processed through livestock, he gains from a 
meadow rotation only when hay has a sufficiently high 
rental or price to cause hay returns to compare favor-
ably with. corn and soybeans. In contrast, the tenant 
realizes the full gain from forage for a livestock pro-
gram and, if he has sufficient capital, maximizes pro-
fit with a forage rotation. Hence, crop-share lease 
An, which does not allow livestock, is examined as an 
alternative to bring about consistency of plans. A cash 
rent of $10 per acre on hay is assumed for lease A~. 
Clarion-Webster soil area. Table 15 summarizes the 
most profitable plans for the landlord and tenant at 
various levels of capital when the tenant is not per-
mitted to raise livestock. An attempt was made. to de-
termine the quantity of capital for the landlord 
which would give both parties the "same relative capi-
tal limitations" based on the $3,000 and $10,000 ten-
ant capital levels. The procedure for arriving at these 
figures consisted of (1) computing a ratio between 
the landlord and tenant capital requirements for each 
activity (only non-livestock activities were included 
in these computations), then (2) multiplying the 
simple mean of these ratios by each of the tenant's 
capital levels ($3,000 and $10,000) to obtain the two 
capital figures for the landlord. The computed capital 
levels for the landlord are shown in A and B, table 15. 
When the alternative of raising livestock is omitted 
from farm planning, neither the landlord nor the 
tenant find it profitable to include meadow in the 
rotation. Though the CCSb rotation is now most 
profitable for both parties at all capital levels, the 
specialized sharing of resources (such as labor and 
machinery) still prevents complete agreement on fer-
tiliza tion rates ( see' A in table 15). The tenant, be-
cause he has a relative advantage in fertilizer use, 
maximizes his profits by fertilizing 147 acres at 'the 
third level with 6 acres in disposal land. The land-
lord, of course, maximizes his profits by having the 
entire farm in rotation and fertilizing to the limits of 
his capital. Hence, in the Clarion-Webster soil area, 
TABLE 15. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE A.o, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Acres of rotation 
Capitallevelt disposal 
Party (dollars ) CCSb. CCSb. landt 
A(Landlord 1,16600 20 188 
. '6 (Tenant 8,000 147 
B(Landlord 8,888ft 158 
(Tenant 10,000 158 
OTypical crop-share lease with $10 per acre cash rent on hay and pasture, but tenant cannot have livestock. 
fCapital available for lise in the farm business. 
Un practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pastore. 
§Retum ahove annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
oOSame relative capital as the tenant, based on $3,000 tenant capital. 
f fSame relative capital as the tenant, based on $10,000 tenant capital. 
952 
Retllm~ (dollars) 
4,224 
2,242 
4,269 
2,841 
, 
TABLE 16. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARK 
LEASE A,o, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Capital level t Acl"t'S of Rotation Return~ 
Party 
A (Landlord 
(Tenant 
B(Landlord 
(Tenant 
C(Landlord 
(Tenant 
(dollars) 
939§ 
3,000 
977 
3,000 
3,13000 
10,000 
CCSb. 
107 
78 
78 
78 
CCSb. CCSb. (dollars) 
47 5,683 
76 3,699 
76 5,724 
76 3,699 
154 6,055 
154 3,932 
OTypical crop-share lease with $10 per acre cash rent on hay and pasture, but tenant cannot have livestock. 
tCapital available for use in the fann business. 
~Retum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
~Same relative capital as the tenant, based on $3,000 tenant capital. 
oOSame relative capital as the tenant, based on $10,000 tenant capital. 
the landlord and tenant cannot reach complete agree-
ment upon an optimum program (even without live-
stock) until both parties have enough capital to plant 
the entire farm to CCSb3 • 
Tama-Muscatine soil area. Table 16 shows the most 
profitable landlord and tenant plans at various levels 
of capital when the tenant is not allowed to produce 
livestock. Because yields without fertilizer are rela-
tively high in the Tama-Muscatine soil area, the 
tenant with $3,000 capital finds no advantage in leav-
ing some acreage in disposal land (see A, table 16). 
Thus, the difficulty of bringing about consistent plans 
for the landlord and tenant at limited capital levels 
is avoided in the Tama-Muscatine soil area.27 
Tables 15 and 16 demonstrate that the plans of 
the landlord and tenant reach virtual agreement if 
( 1) the tenant is prohibited from raising livestock 
and (2) each party has roughly the same relative 
capital limitation. Perhaps few tenants would agree 
to a lease which prohibits livestock production; a 
tenant would agree to such a lease at a sacrifice in 
income under the prices assumed for this study. 
While the restriction on livestock forces the two 
plans to become consistent, this point should be em-
phasized: The single plan which maximizes profits 
for the tenant and landlord is not the optimum plan 
for the farm as a whole. Greater income can be at-
tained, for given collections of resources, if livestock 
are allowed to be produced. Thus, while the necessary 
condition between tenant and landlord is attained 
(see earlier discussion), the suffiCient condition be-
tween leasing parties and the farm as a whole is not 
attained. Another plan could be found which allows 
a greater income for the farm as a whole and, there-
fore, which allows greater profits to both tenant and 
landlord. 
For example, under crop-share lease Ar. (no live-
stock allowed) in the Clarion-Webster soil area, the 
combined return of the landlord and tenant with un-
limiting capital is $6,610 (B in table 15). However, 
by combining the resources of the two parties and 
allowing livestock production, the return from the 
optimum plan for the entire farm is $7,618; an in-
crease of $1,008. Likewise, income from the optimum 
farm plan in the Tama-Muscatine soil area is in-
"The divergence in tenant and landlord programs at limited capital 
levels in table 16 can be attributed to the manner in which the "same 
relative capital level" is detennined. Since an average ratio between 
landlord and tenant capital requirements is used, any particular activity 
chosen will have a slillhtly different ratio. Thus, if the landlord has $977 
capital, both parties will desire exactly the same program (B in table 16). 
creased by $400 when the resources of the two parties 
are pooled and livestock production is permitted.2~ 
Thus, while the two parties find consistent plans when 
livestock production is prohibited, another plan in-
cluding livestock can be found which increases the 
total income for the farm. 
TYPICAL LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASE 
Under the typical livestock-share lease, all livestock 
investment, expenses and returns are shared equally 
between the landlord and tenant. However, the tenant 
furnishes all machinery and pays the operating ex-
penses while the landlord pays all real estate expenses. 
The livestock-share lease is included as a possible 
basis for consistency of plans since the following has 
been apparent throughout the analysis: The higher 
profits to the tenant from engaging in livestock enter-
prises causes his optimum plan to differ from that 
of the landlord. 
It was pointed out in the previous discussion that 
virtually complete agreement between leasing parties 
can be reached if the tenant is prohibited from rais-
ing livestock (providing the two parties have roughly 
the same relative capital limitations). However, such 
an arrangement precludes attainment of the sufficient 
condition outlined at the outset. (Also, many tenants 
object to a lease prohibiting them from engaging in 
livestock enterprises.) An alternative more nearly in 
line with both necessary and sufficient conditions is a 
lease under which livestock is jointly owned. The fol-
lowing discussion is based upon the analysis of the 
most common form of such a livestock-share lease. 
Clarion-'l'ebster soil area. Table 17 summarizes 
the most profitable programs for the landlord and 
tenant under a typical livestock-share lease at various 
capital levels. Complete agreement between landlord 
and tenant is reached when the landlord has $2,000 
capital and the tenant has $4,000 capital (roughly 
the same relative capital limitations for each party, 
A in table 17). Because operating expenses and real 
estate expenses are paid individually, the net return 
and capital requirement for each activity is somewhat 
different for the two parties. Yet the same activities 
hold a relative advantage for both parties, thus p~r­
mitting identical optimum programs. Further, if ·fhe 
capital resources of the two parties are combined (a 
total of $6,000 = $2,000 + $4,000) the optimum plan 
"While the details of these plans are not shown in tabulnr fonn, the 
input-output relationships used are the same as those used in computing 
the p]ans for lease A5 (110 livestock allowed). 
953 
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TABLE 17. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER A TYPICAL 
UVESTOCK-SHARE LEASEo, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDWHD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Fann 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Party 
C':fcitallevel t ( ollars) CCSbl CCSba CSbCOM. CCOM. 
disposal calves§ hogsOO RetumH 
landt (no.) (litters) (dollars) 
A(Landlord 2,000 146 7 10 4,435 (Tenant 4,000 146 7 10 2,398 
B(Landlord 500 129 i5s '55 'io 2,854 (Tenant Unlimiting 2,814 
C(Landlord Unlimiting i40 153 44 10 4,818 (Tenant 3,000 13 2,025 
D(Landlord Unlimiting . 153 iS3 44 10 4,818 (Tenant Unlimiting 55 10 2,814 
OTenant furnishes labor and operating expenseS; landlord pays real estate expenses. All other receipts and expenses shared 50-50. 
tCapital avw1able for use in the farm business. 
Un practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
§Choice steer calves, full-fed on pastore. 
° 0Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
f t Retom above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
for the farm as a whole is exactly the same as that for 
each party individually (A in table 17). Also, the 
return from this optimum farm plan equals the sum 
of the returns to the individual parties. Thus, both 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for leasing 
efficiency are met in this case. 
When both the landlord and tenant have unlimiting 
capital, their most profitable programs are somewhat 
different (D in table 17). This difference is slight, 
however, since additional computations (not . shown 
here) reveal that the landlord can shift to the tenant's 
optimum plan with a decrease of only $14 in over-all 
net return; the tenant can shift to the landlord's opti-
mum plan with a decrease of less than $50 in net re-
turns. Such small differences can be easily resolved. 
The variance in optimum plans can again be at-
tributed to the speCialized payment of expenses associ-
ated with the machinery and real estate resources. 
The landlord and tenant interests are nearly parallel 
under a livestock-share lease when each party has 
roughly the same relative capital limitations. Table 17 
indicates, however, that conflict still exists if the two 
parties have widely different capital resources (B and 
C in table 17). This finding provides further evidence 
that leasing shares must be allowed to vary with the 
capital resources of the parties involved if leasing 
efficiency is to be attained relative to profit maximiza-
tion by both parties. 
Tama-Muscatine soil area. Table 18 again reveals a 
high measure of consistency in planning for the Tama-
Muscatine soil area when the two parties are (1) 
subject to roughly the same relative capital limitations 
or (2) have unlimiting capital. As examples, when 
both parties have approximately the same relative 
capital limitations (A in table 18), the landlord can 
adopt the tenant's optimum plan with only $33 sacri-
fice in income; when both parties have unlimiting 
capital the tenant can shift to the landlord's optimum 
program with less than $5 sacrifice in income.29 
The following conclusion is apparent from the 
analysis of the livestock-share lease: If the necessary 
conditions for leasing efficiency are attained under the 
livestock-share lease, the sufficient conditions will be 
simultaneously satisfied. In other words, if a single 
plan is optimum for both leasing parties, this same 
plan will be optimum from the standpOint of the farm 
as a unit. If the optimum plans of the parties differ 
only slightly, a compromise plan may be worked out 
which deviates little from the optimum plan for the 
farm as a whole. 
While the livestock-share lease is effective in re-
moving leasing conflicts when the two parties have the 
same relative capital limitations, considerable differ-
ences do exist for cases in which the capital resources 
of the two parties are greatly divergent30 (B and C in 
table 18). Also, to be successful, the livestock-share 
"The details of these computations are omitted here. 
30 An important difference between the two soil areas i. that a cattle 
enterprise never enters into the optimum prograJn in the Tama-Muscatine 
soil area under a livestock lease, table 18, while cattle are included in the 
programs for the Clarion-Webster soil area, table 17. This difference 
can be explained as follows: In the Tama-Muscatine soil area, the net 
returns from CCSb. are higher than the relums from any of the meadow-
cattle feeding activities; capital requirements are also lower for the 
CCSh. activity than for the meadow-cattle feeding activities. Therefore, 
a cattle fee~ing activity never enters into the optimum program. 
TABLE 18. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGHAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER A TYPICAL 
LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASEo, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLOHD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Capitallevelf 
CCSbl CCSb. CCSb. party (dollars) 
A(Landlord 
(Tenant 
2,000 
4,000 
B(Landlord 500 129 
(Tenant 10,000 
C(Landiord Unlimiting 
(Tenant 3,000 '78 76 
Acres of rotation 
CCSb< CSbCOM< CCOM3 
148 6 
"4 150 
i48 
147 7 
CCOl\h 
disposal 
landt 
25 
Farm 
livestock program 
--hogs§ -Retom'" 
( litters) ( dollars ) 
10 6,217 
8 4,070 
'i2 
12 
4,058 
4,135 
6,255 
3,699 
D(Landlord Unlimiting 147 7 12 6,255 
(Tenant Unlimiting 148 6 12 4,135 
OTenant furnishes labor and operating expenses; landlord pays real estate expenses. All other receipts and expenses shared 50-50. 
tCapital available for use in the farm business, 
Un practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pastore. 
§Total litters per year (equal numhers of spring and fall litters ,. 
oORctum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
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lease requires a landlord with a relatively high capital 
level and livestock managerial ability. The tenant, on 
the other hand, must not object to "caring for the 
landlord's livestock." If such obstacles can be sur-
mounted, it appears that the livestock-share lease can 
serve to reduce friction in farm rental agreements. 
CHOICE BETWEEN TYPES OF LEASES 
The most common share leasing arrangements in 
the areas studied are the typical crop-share lease and 
the typical livestock-share lease. Conflicts between 
landlord and tenant may arise, not only within the 
framework of a given lease, but with respect to the 
type of lease which should be used in renting the 
farm. Accordingly, the following analysis allows the 
tenant and landlord a choice of the most profitable 
type of lease at various capital levels. This phase of 
the study is used to determine whether an arrange-
ment which gives consistency of plans and maximum 
returns for the farm is the "optimum choice," from 
the standpoint of level of income, for either party. 
Conflicts which arise within leases and between lease 
types are then discussed. Choice of leases is restricted 
to the typical crop-share lease and the typical live-
stock-share lease. 
Clarion-Webster soil area. Table 19 summarizes the 
most profitable lease type and farm plans for the land-
lord and tenant at various capital levels. Lines A, B 
and C in table 19 indicate the same conflicts, due to 
sharing arrangements and different capital levels, 
which arise under the typical crop-share lease (see 
previous discussion under the crop-share lease AI, 
table 7). Lines D, E, F and G in table 19, however, 
indicate conflict of a different nature; conflict in re-
gard to the most profitable type of lease for each 
party. This conflict appears to be particularly serious 
since the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory com-
promise is often extremely difficult. The tenant suf-
fers a large reduction in net return if forced to accept 
a livestock-share lease rather than a crop-share lease. 
Conversely, the landlord with $2,000 or more in capi-
tal (D, E, F and G in table 19) realizes less net return 
if a crop-share rather than a livestock-share lease is 
used. Of course, only landlords with sufficient capital 
can use a livestock-share lease. 
The landlord with a high capital level prefers the 
livestock-share lease because it provides him with 
profitable invesbnent alternatives for more capital 
resources (i.e., under the livestock-share lease the 
landlord can invest in livestock production as well 
as crop production). At all capital levels the tenant 
finds it most profitable to enter into a crop-share 
lease and operate his own livestock program. He 
realizes a higher return under the crop-share lease 
because he receives all of the return from livestock. 
Under a livestock-share lease the tenant not only 
divides the crop returns, but also divides the livestock 
returns with the landlord. The landlord, however, 
finds the livestock lease more profitable at higher 
levels of landlord capital (D, E, F and G in table 19). 
, Tama-Muscatine soil area. Table 20 sets forth the 
optimum lease type and farm plan for the landlord 
and tenant at various capital levels. The general 
pattern for the Tama-Muscatine soil area (table 20) is 
the same as for the Clarion-Webster soil area (table 
19). At all capital levels, the tenant finds it most 
profitable to operate under a crop-share lease, while 
organizing his livestock program independent of the 
landlord. As in the Clarion-Webster soil area, the 
landlord with $2,000 or more in capital (D, E, F and 
G in table 20) finds it most profitable to shift to a 
livestock-share lease in order to gain profitable uses 
for his capital. Again the conflict of interests cannot 
be easily resolved; either party sacrifices large returns 
by moving to the less profitable type of lease. 
The results of allowing a choice between lease 
types show a high degree of consistency for both loea-
TABLE 19. MOST PRoFrrABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA WHEN THE TWO PARTIES HAVE A CHOICE BETWEEN A TYPICAL LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASE- AND A TYPICAL CROP-SHARE LEASEt. WlTH VARIOUS LEVELS OF CAPITAL. 
Most 
Party Car.itallevea dollars) r.rolitable ease§ 
A(Landlord 500 Crop (Tenant 3,000 Crop 
B(Landlord 1,200 Crop (Tenant 3,000 Crop 
C(Landlord 1,200 Crop (Tenant 10,000 Crop 
D(Landlord 2,000 , Ivestock (Tenant 3,000 Crop 
E(Landlord 2,000 Livestock (Tenant 5,000 Crop 
F(Landlord 2,000 Livestock (Tenant 10,000 Crop 
G(Landlord 7,107000 Liv .... tock (Tenant 10,000 Crop 
CCSbl 
130 
Acres of rotation 
CCSb. CSbCOM. 
i47 
153 
147 
153 
15 
14A 
147 
146 
139 
146 
15 
'is 
ill2 
7 
7 
14 
7 
132 
153 
132 
CCOM. 
disposal landoo 
23 
6 
, '6 
Farm livestock program 
calvestt hogsH (no. ) ( litters ) 
'40 'io 
10 
. '2 10 10 
'40 10 10 
44 10 
40 10 
OTenant furnishes labor and operating expenses; landlord pays real estate expenses. All other receipts and expenses shared 50-50. 
tWith $10 per aCrC cash rent on bay and pasture. 
tCapital available for use in the farm business. §Jf each party could separately specify the lease. Of course, two different leases could not be used simultaneously on the same farm. UIn practicc, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
t tChoice st...er calves, full-fed on pasture. UTotallitters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
HRetum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted . 
••• Same relative capital as the tenant, based on $10,000 tenant capital. 
RetumH (dollars) 
2,854 
2,242 
4,331 
2,242 
4,331 
4,119 
4,435 
2,242 
4,435 
2,854 
4,435 
4,119 
4,818 
4,119 
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TABLE 20. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA WHEN THE TWO 
PARTIES HAVE A CHOICE BETWEEN A TYPICAL LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASE" AND A TYPICAL CROP-SHARE LEASEt, WITH,VARIOUS 
LEVELS OF CAPITAL. ' 
Most Acres of rotation 
Farm 
livestock program 
Party 
Capital level; 
( dollars) 
profitable 
lease§ CCSb1 CCSb. 
disposal 
CCSb. CCSb_ CSbCOM- CCOM. land'" 
calvestt hogsU 
(no. ) (litters ) 
Retuml~ 
(dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 Crop 
(Tenat·t 3,000 Crop 
B(Landlord 1,200 Crop 
(Tenant 3,000 Crop 
C(Landl~rd 1,200 Crop 
(Tenant 10,000 Crop 
D~Landlord 2,000 Livestock 
Tenant 3,000 Crop 
E(Landlord 2,000 Livestock 
(Tenant 5,000 Crop 
F(Landlord 2',000 Livestock 
(Tenant 10,000 Crop 
G~LandlOrd 6,000000 Livestock 
Tenant 10,000 Crop 
129 
'7S 
'7S 106 48 76 
106 48 iss 
'7S '76 148 6 
148 6 
145 9 
148 6 
136 
147 7 
136 
25 
, is, '40 
"i 
'is '40 
'is '40 
'i2 
10 
10 
12 
10 
12 
12 
12 
4,058 
3,699 
5,903 
3,699 
5,903 
5,550 
6,217 
3,699 
6,217 
4,436 
6,217 
5,550 
6,255 
5,550 
OTenant furnishes labor and operating expenses; landlord pays real estate expenses, All other receipts and expenses shared 50-50. 
t With $10 per acre cash rent on hay and pasture. 
tCapital available for use in the fann business. 
§If each party could separately specify the lease. Of course, two different leases could Dot be used simultaneously on th .. same fann. 
oOIn practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
t t Deferred-fed steer calves, good to choice grade. 
HTotal litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
HReturn above annual expenses with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
O·"Same relative capital as the tenant, based on $10,000 tenant capital. 
tions. While it was shown previously that a livestock~ 
share lease is effective in reducing leasing problems, 
it becomes apparent that if the tenant has a choice 
between leases he will reject the livestock-share lease 
in favor of the crop-share lease. One situation under 
which the tenant can gain, or can be made no worse 
off, is where he does not have capital for a large 
. livestock program. In this case, investment in live-
stock by the landlord, up to the limits of the tenant's 
capital and building space permits the tenant to 
obtain an income at least as high as under a crop-
share lease. Also, the tenant sometimes may benefit 
from a livestock-share lease, where the landlord has 
superior managerial ability. 
A livestock-share lease is most often found on 
farms where the landlord has (a) sufficient capital 
and (b) greater bargaining power than the tenant 
or the tenant has very limited funds for livestock. 
Also, in some cases the tenant must accept a live-
stock-share lease or go without renting the farm, 
even though he would make more profit if he could 
have the entire livestock investment. 
CASH LEASE 
The cash lease is another type of leasing arrange-
ment found in the areas studied which is examined 
in respect to efficiency. Under a cash lease the tenant 
pays a fixed per-acre cash rent for the entire farm; 
he also pays all expenses except real estate expenses 
but, in turn, receives all returns from crop and live-
stock sales from the farm. 
The cost structure of the farm firm for a cash 
renter is the same as for an owner-operator except 
for fixed costs. Since both an owner-operator and a 
cash renter pay all variable costs, they are faced 
with the same. marginal cost curve. 81 Hence, the 
cash tenant with security of tenure can be expected 
to organize his farm in essentially the same manner 
as an owner-operator with like capital limitations. 
The results in this section can, therefore, be extended 
to the owner-operator category with little prospect of 
error. 
Table 21 summarizes the most profitable programs 
for the tenant.under a cash lease for the two soil areas 
studied. When the tenant is limited to $3,000 capital 
(A and C in table 21), his optimum program for 
both areas is the CCSb rotation fertilized at the :first 
"'For details on this point, see: Heady, Earl O. Economics of agri-
cultural production and resource uSe. Prentice-Hall, New York. 1952. 
Ch.20. 
TABLE 21. MOST PROFITABLE TENANT PROGRAMS IN THE CLARION-WEBSTER AND TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREAS UNDER A 
CASH LEASE", WITH TWO LEVELS OF TENANT CAPITAL. 
party 
A (Tenant 
B(Tenant 
C(Tenant 
D(Tenant 
Soil area 
Clarlon-
Webster 
Clarion-
Webster 
Tam a-
Muscatine 
Tama-
Muscatine 
Capital 
ievelt 
(dollars) 
3,000 
10,000 
3,000 
10,000 
CCSbl 
58 
82 
Acres of rotation 
CCSb. CCSb. CCSh. 
95 
34 
72 
148 
CSbCOM. CCOM. 
119 
Tenant's 
livestock program 
calves~ hogs§ 
(no. ) (litters) 
33 10 
12 
"Tenant pays a fixed rent for the fann; he pays all variable costs but also receives all crop and livestock sales from the fann. 
tCapital available for use in the farm business. 
tChoice steer calves, full-fed on pasture. 
§Total litters per year (equal numbers of sPring and fall litters)., . 
"OReturn above annual expenses (not includmg the cash rent payment), With fixed costs still to be deducted. 
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, Retum° O 
(dollars) 
5,543 
7,802 
8,879 
10,640 
and second levels. With this limited quantity of 
capital the cash tenant (or owner-operator) will 
maximize profits from the CCSb rotation since it gives 
the greatest return per dollar invested. 
With $10,000 capital the optimum program for the 
tenant differs considerably between the two soil 
areas (B and D in table 21). Capital, hog space and 
land become limiting resources in the Clarion-Web-
ster soil area. Hogs are produced to the capacity of 
hog building space; the remaining land and capital 
is divided optimally between the CSbCOMa and 
CCSba rotations and the cattle enterprise (B in table 
21). In the Tama-Muscatine soil area only land and 
'hog space are limiting resources at the $10,000 tenant 
capital level (D in table 21). Because yields from the 
CCSb rotation are relatively high in the Tama-Mus-
catine soil area, the CCSb4 rotation has a higher net 
return per acre under the cash lease than any of the 
meadow rotation-cattle activities. Therefore, hogs 
are produced to the limits of space restrictions, and 
the major portion of the land (148 acres) is planted 
to CCSb4• 
Only the tenant plans need to be examined under 
cash leasing because the landlord receives a specified 
rental regardless of the plan followed by the tenant. 
The optimum program for the tenant aside from un-
certainty and length of tenure aspects, is the optimum 
program for the farm as a whole, . given the amount 
of capital possessed by the tenant. (The tenant has 
the same optimum program as an owner-operator 
with the same capital available for variable costs.) 
A cash lease entirely removes conflict between the 
landlord and tenant if the two parties can find a 
mutually satisfactory rental rate for the farm. Under 
a cash lease the landlord has no direct concern over 
the organization of the farm (within the limits of 
acceptable conservation practices, etc.) since his in-
come is dependent only upon the amount of the cash 
rental payment. The tenant, by treating the cash rent 
as a fixed cost, is free to organize the farm in any 
manner which maximizes his profits. Under a cash 
lease, the tenant assumes greater risk from price and 
yield fluctuations than he would under a crop-share 
lease. For this reason, the tenant ordinarily realizes 
a somewhat higher income over a period of time; 
the landlord usually realizes less income because he 
takes less year-to-year weather risk. 
Capital limitations, and the inherently greater risk, 
on the part of the tenant probably explain why the 
cash lease is not more widely adopted. However, the 
above findings indicate that the cash lease holds great 
promise for reducing leasing friction where the land-
lord and tenant are willing to enter into such an ar-
rangement. Perhaps a system of flexible cash rents is 
needed to allow tenants with lower capital levels to 
rent farms on a cash basis and lessen certain of the 
risk of uncertainty problems associated with cash 
renting. 
APPENDIX A 
BASIC DATA 
TABLE A-I. BASIC INPUT-OUTPUT DATA FOR THE LIVESTOCK 
ENTERPRISES CONSIDERED. 
Item Unit 
Feed red per uniU 
Com equivalent bu. 
Supplement lb. 
Hay lb. 
Pasture aCre 
Hay equivalent lb. 
Labor man-hours 
Two 
litter 
hog 
systemO 
8.2 
47.8 
·o·.i1ia 
45.1 
1.93~ 
Pasture-
red 
steer 
calvest 
50.0 
299.0 
1,766.0 
0.7 
3,206.0 
18.700 
Deferred-
red 
steer 
calvest 
53.7 
268.1 
2,267.0 
1.2 
6,907.0 
12.5 
Annual expenses dollars 
Protein 2.70 10.94 12.87 
Power 0.74 2.40 2.74 
Equipment 0.76 2.46 2.88 
Miscellaneous 1.09 2.30 2.68 
Death loss 2.59 2.42 
Feeder stock purchases 103.61 96.86 
Total annual expense '5'.29' 124.30 120.45 
Capital investn\ent 2.87 13.50 13.50 
Total capital outlay 8.16 137.80 133.95 
• Source: Minnesota Reports 206, 214, 215. University of Minnesota. 
1947-51; Detailed cost report for central Illinois. 1952-53. AE 296!J. 
Dept. of Agr. Econ., University of Illinois. 1953. 
tSource: Beresferd, Rex. One hundred fifty-one questions on cattle 
feeding and marketing. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. and Iowa Agr. Ext. Servo 
TABLE A-2. CONSTANT PER-ACRE COST FOR CROPS USED IN 
STUDY." 
Crops 
Item Com Oats Soybeans Meadow 
Tractor overhead 2.64 2.73 2.63 2.64 
Tractor operating t 3.03 1.55 2.96 2.74 
Machinery overhead 6.57 4.34 5.61 3.08 
Seed 1.92 2.05 4.30 5.87 
Building repair 3.01 2.44 1.56 2.84 
Total constant cost 17.17 13.11 17.06 17.17 
"These costs arc estimates of those expenses nonnally required to seed 
and cultivate the speciSed crops. For costs that vary with rate of fertilizer 
applications, see table A-3. These data are adapted from: Bowlen, Ber-
nard J. Production planning of crops for Iowa farms. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. Iowa State ColJege Library, Ames, Iowa. 1954. 
. t Includes fuel, grease and repairs. 
Bu\. P99. 1949; Malone, Carl C. Guides to proSts for cattle feeders. 
lc,wa Agr. Ext. Servo Pamphlet 127. 1950; Annual feeder cattle reports. 
III. Agr. Exp. Sta. 1938-54. 
lOne unit refers to 100 Ibs. of pork produced for hogs and one head 
for calves . 
~Adapted from: An appraisal of agricultural production capacity in 
Iowa. Iowa Agr. Ext. Bu\. AN153. 1952. . 
··Adapted from: Heady, E. O. and Olsen, R. O. Substitution relation-
ships, ","ource requirements and income variability in the utilization at 
forage crops. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. BuI. 390. 1954. 
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TABLE A-3. TOTAL ANNUAL COST PER ACRE OF ROTATION CROPS.· 
Rotation and fertilization level t 
CCSb CCOM CSbCOM 
Type of cost 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 
Clarion-Webster soil area 
ConstanU 17.13 17.13 17.13 17.18 16.16 16.16 16.16 16.16 16.34 16.34 16.34 16.34 
Fertilizer 
'3'.39 
8.97 8.01 11.68 
'5.96 
2.62 6.19 9.37 
'5.86 
2.39 4.85 7.80 
Harvesting 3.83 4.13 4.22 6.57 6.94 7.15 6.38 6.45 6.49 
Total 20.52 24.93 29.27 33.03 22.12 25.35 29.29 32.68 22.20 25.11 27.64 30.63 
Tama-Muscatine soil area 
Constant 17.13 17.13 17.18 17.13 16.16 16.16 16.16 16.16 16.34 16.34 16.34 16.34 
Fertilizer 
'3.89 
3.50 6.36 10.97 
'6'.30 
3.55 6.62 8.22 
·s.is 2.84 5.30 7.02 Harvestiog 4.50 4.76 4.93 7.31 7.76 8.52 6.91 7.41 7.89 
Total 21.02 25.13 28.23 33.03 22.46 27.02 30.54 82.90 22.52 26.09 29.05 31.25 
"Adapted from:Bowlen, Bernard J. Production planning of crops for Iowa fanns. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Iowa State College Library, Ames, Iowa. 
1954. 
tFor commercial fertilizer rate at each fertilization level referred to by I, 2, 3 and 4 above, see table 2. 
tCalculated from the data in table A-2. 
APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES OF RESULTS 
TABLE B-1. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER TYPICAL 
CROP-SHARE LEASE At·, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Party 
Capitallevelt 
(dollars ) CCSbt CCSb. CSbCOM. 
disposal-
landt 
calves~ (no.) hogs"· (litters) ReturnH (dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 130 
i47 
28 2,854 
(Tenant 3,000 6 2.242 
B(Landlord 500 130 
'i4 i39 
23 
'40 'io 
2,854 
(Tenant 10,000 4,481 
C(Landlord 1.200 153 
, '0 4.331 (Tenant 3,000 147 2.242 
D(Landlord 1.200 153 
i39 '40 'io 
4,331 
(Tenant 10,000 14 4.481 
E(Landlord 2.000 153 4,331 
(Tenant 3,000 '147 6 2.242 
F(Landlord 2,000 153 
i39 '40 
4,331 
(Tenant 10,000 14 10 4,481 
G~Landlord Unlimiting 153 4,331 
Tenant 3,000 147 6 2,242 
H(Landlord Unlimiting 153 
iS9 '40 
4,331 
(Tenant 10,000 14 10 4,481 
"With $16 and $25 per acre cash rent on hay and rotation pasture. 
tCapital available' for use in the farm business. 
nn practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay or pasture. 
§Choice steer calves, full-fed on pasture, 
""Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
t tRetum above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. Cash rent on hay is not yet deducted from the tenant's retum. 
TABLE B-2. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER A TYPICAL 
CROP-SHARE LEASEo WHERE THE LANDLORD RECEIVES ONLY 40 PERCENT OF THE SOYBEANS, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LAND-
LORD AND TENANT CAPITAL, 
Acres of rotation 
Party 
Capitallev,,1 t 
(dollars ) CCSbl CCSb. CCSb. 
A(Landlord 500 129 
'78 (Tenant 3,000 76 
B(Landlord 500 129 
(Tenant 10,000 
C(Landlord 1,200 
'78 
106 
(Tenant 3,000 76 
D~Landlord 1.200 106 
Tenant 10,000 
E(Landlord 2,000 
'78 '76 (Tenant 3,000 
F(Landlord 
(Tenant 
2,000 
10,000 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 
76 (Tenant 3,000 78 
lJ(Landlord Unlimiting 
(Tenant 10,000 
.With $25 per acre cash rent on hay and pasture. 
tCapital available for use in the farm business. 
Un r.ractice disposal land would probably be used for hay or pasture. 
§ De erred-f~ steer calves, good to choice grade. 
OOTotal litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
tt Returns above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted, 
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CCSb. 
48 
48 
154 
154 
154 
154 
Tenant's 
livestock program 
disposal 
CSbCOM. landt 
25 
calves§ hogs·· Retumtt (no.) (litters ) (dollars) 
3,729 
4,093 
25 
154 38 'i2 
3,729 
5,322 
5,494 
4,093 
154 , 38 
5,494 
12 5,322 
5,606 
4,093 
i54 '38 
5,606 
12 5,322 
5,606 
4,093 
i54 '38 '12' 5,606 5,322 
TABLE B-3. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAI\1A-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-SHARE 
LEASE A.9; WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level t calves* hogs§ RetumO O 
Party (dollars) CCSbl CCSb. CCSb, CSbCOM. CCOM. (no. ) (litters) (dollars ) 
A(Landlord 500 S2 '72 154 7,109 (Tenant 3,000 2,939 
B(Landlord 500 
'is 154 i30 . '(; 7,109 (Tenant 10,000 34 J.2 4,105 
C(Landlord 1,200 154 7,109 (Tenant 3,000 82 72 2,939 
D(Landlord 1,200 154 i30 . '(; '34 'i2 7,109 (Tenant 10,000 18 4,105 
E(Landlord 2,000 
'72 154 7,109 (Tenant 3,OO() 82 2,939 
F(Landlord 2,000 
'is 154 i30 '34 7,109 (Tenant 10,000 6 12 4,105 
G(Landlord U nlirniting 
'S2 '72 154 7,109 (Tenant 3,00() 2,939 
H(Landlord Unlirniting 154 
'34 7,109 (Tenant 10,000 18 130 6 12 4,105 
°With $25 per acre cash rent on bay and pasture, except that tenant pays all fertlizer and seed expenses. 
t Capital available for use in tile fann business. 
*Defeircd-fed steer calves, good to choice grade. 
§Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
o .Return above annual expenses, with fixed costs still to be deducted. 
TABLE B-4. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA WHEN ALL CROP 
RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES ARE DIVIDED 60-40 BETWEEN THE LANDLORD AND TENANT, WITH VAlUOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD 
AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level· disposal calves * hogs§ RctumOO 
Party (dollars ) eeSb. CCSb. CSbCOM. CSbCOM. CeOM. landt (no.) (litters) (dollars ) 
A(Landlord 500 36 117 868 
(Tenant 3,000 147 6 8 2,979 
B(Landlord 500 36 
. 's '73 117 868 (Tenant 10,000 72 50 10 4,244 
C(Landlord 1,200 87 i47 . '(; 66 ·s 2,084 (Tenant 3,0()() 2,979 
D(Landlord 1,200 87 
'72 66 2,084 (Tenant 10,000 8 73 50 10 4,244 
E(Landlord 2,000 145 8 3,473 
(Tenant 3,000 147 6 8 2,979 
F(Landlord 2,000 145 
. 's '73 8 3,473 (Tenant IO,OO() 72 50 10 4,244 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 153 
"'6 "s 4,113 (Tenant 3,000 147 2,979 
H(Landlord Unlimiting 153 
'72 .. 50 io 4,113 (Tenant IO,OO() 8 73 4,244 
OCapital available for use in the fann business. 
for hay tIn practice, disposal land would probably be used and pasture. 
*Choicc steer calves, full-fed on pasture. 
§Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
• ·Return above annual expenses, with fixed costs' still to be deducted. 
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TABLE B-5. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE CLARION-WEBSTER SOIL AREA UNDER CROP-
SHARE LEASE A,o, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Party 
Capital level f (dollars) CCSb. CCSb. CSbCOMl CSbCOM. CCOM. 
disposal calves§ hogsO O Retumff 
landt (no.) (litter) (dollars ) 
A(Landlord 500 
i49 
49 
" "4 104 " "6 881 (Tenant 3,000 3,527 
B(Landlord 500 49 Hi "si 104 "46 "i<i 881 (Tenant 10,000 4,618 
C(Landlord 1,200 
i49 
117 
" "4 36 " "6 2,114 (Tenant 3,000 3,527 
D(Landlord 1,200 117 
iii "si 
36 
"46 "i<i 
2,114 
(Tenant 10,000 4.618 
E(Landlord 2,000 24 129 
"4 "6 3,372 (Tenant 3,000 149 3,527 
F(Landlord 2,000 24 129 
"si '46 "i<i 
3,372 
(Tenant 10,000 122 4,618 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 153 
" "4 " "6 3,430 (Tenant 3,000 149 3,527 
H(Landlord Unlimiting 153 
iii "46 "i<i 
3,430 (Tenant 10,000 31 4,618 
"Receipts and expenses On all crops are divided 50-50 between landlord and tenant, except that tenant pays $25 per acre cash rent for hay and 
pasture instead of half the value of the hay or pasture. 
fCapital available for use in the fann business. 
tin practice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
§Choice steer calves, full-fed on pasture. 
""Total litters per year (equal numbers of spring and fall litters). 
ff Return above annual expenses, with fixed cost. still to be deducted. 
TABLE B-6. MOST PROFITABLE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROGRAMS FOR THE TAMA-MUSCATINE SOIL AREA WHEN ALL CROP 
RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES ARE DIVIDED 60-40 BETWEEN THE LANDLORD AND TENANT, WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF LANDLORD 
AND TENANT CAPITAL. 
Tenant's 
Acres of rotation livestock program 
Capital level" disposal calvest hogs~ Return"O 
Party (dollars ) CCSbl CCSb. CCSb. CSbCOM. CCOM. landt (no.) (litters) (dollars) 
A(Landlord 500 42 
i49 "5 
112 
" "s 1,272 (Tenant 3,000 4,320 
B(Landlord 500 42 
i54 
112 
"49 "ii 
1,272 (Tenant 10,000 5,211 
C(LandlorU 1,200 100 
i49 " '5 
54 
. "s 3,052 (Tenant 3,000 4,320 
D~Landlord 1,200 100 
154 
54 
"49 "i2 
3,052 
Tenant 10,000 5,211 
E(Landlord 2,000 94 60 
i49 " "5 . ·s 5,027 (Tenant 3,000 4,320 
F(Landlotd 2,000 94 60 
i54 '49 'ii 
5,027 
(Tenant 10,000 5,211 
G(Landlord Unlimiting 154 
"5 '"s 6,015 (Tenant 3,000 149 4,320 
H(Landlord Unlimiting 154 
i54 '49 'ii 
6,015 
(Tenant 10,000 5,211 
"Capital available for use in the farm business. 
tIn r.;ractice, disposal land would probably be used for hay and pasture. 
tOe erred-fed calves, good to choice grade. 
§Total litters per year (equal numbers of fring and fall litters). 
"ORetum above annllal expenses, with fixe costs still to be deducted. 
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